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THE RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL ABSOLUTISM

ERIC BERGER*
ABSTRACT
Though constitutional doctrine is famously unpredictable, Supreme
Court Justices often imbue their constitutional opinions with a sense
of inevitability. Rather than concede that evidence is sometimes
equivocal, Justices insist with great certainty that they have divined
the correct answer. This Article examines this rhetoric of constitutional absolutism and its place in our broader popular constitutional
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discourse. After considering examples of the Justices’ rhetorical
performances, this Article explores strategic, institutional, and
psychological explanations for the phenomenon. It then turns to the
rhetoric’s implications, weighing its costs and benefits. This Article
ultimately argues that the costs outweigh the benefits and proposes
a more nuanced, conciliatory constitutional discourse that would
acknowledge competing arguments without compromising legal
clarity or the rule of law.
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But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man.
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right;
the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand the minds
of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which
weighs their interests alongside its own without bias.
—Learned Hand2
The majority’s reasoning is faulty. It proves too much. It sets the law
upon a slippery slope. It is too clever by half. It is unprecedented. It
cannot withstand scrutiny. It will lead to absurd results.... It
legislates from the bench. It cannot be taken literally. It seizes upon
hard facts to make bad law. It is wrong.
—Kyle Graham3
INTRODUCTION
Pick up many a Supreme Court opinion about constitutional law,
and you are likely to think that constitutional answers come easy.4
Justices confidently announce their decisions and bolster their
holdings with indisputable evidence.5 The question might be
complex, but there is rarely much doubt as to the correctness of the
Court’s conclusion—at least until you turn the page and start
reading the dissent.6

1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
2. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (3d ed. 1960).
3. Kyle Graham, The Ultimate Dissent, NONCURATLEX COM ( Aug. 19, 2013 ), http://
noncuratlex.com/?p=2054 [http://perma.cc/496L-7M29].
4. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59
(2011).
5. See Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 188-89 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
6. See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Judicial Overstating, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 411,
411 (2013).
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In fact, notwithstanding some Justices’ rhetorical confidence,
constitutional law rarely yields certain answers.7 The Constitution’s
text is famously underdeterminate; even the new originalists, who
swear fealty to the document’s original public meaning, concede that
in some important cases, the text’s meaning will “run out” and not
provide an answer.8 And most constitutional interpreters pay only
minimal attention to the text anyway, focusing instead on an
accumulation of practices and principles continuously debated
through the generations.9 It is no wonder, then, that the first-year
law student finds her head spinning as she tries to grasp the
numerous factors that shape constitutional meaning,10 including,
among others, common-law-like precedents,11 complex constitutional
history,12 structure,13 morality,14 and evolving societal norms.15
As one might expect, there is great disagreement about whether,
when, and how to apply each of these modalities. Constitutional
adjudication, then, is more art than science, defying the mechanical
application of formal rules.16 Consequently, even lawyers and
professors best acquainted with the Supreme Court’s practices often
have difficulty predicting constitutional outcomes. Indeed, after the
Court does rule, there is often bitter disagreement about whether
the decision was correct.17
7. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and
Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (2006) (“Few major
constitutional debates are clear-cut propositions.”).
8. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 19, 109-10 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/QD7G-F6ZH.
9. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33-35 (2010) (arguing that in most
constitutional decisions, the text plays “at most, a ceremonial role”).
10. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991) (describing historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential modalities).
11. See generally STRAUSS, supra note 9, at 33-50.
12. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 95-138, 333-38
(2012).
13. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31 (1969).
14. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-3 (1997).
15. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14-18
(2009); Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 117 (2012).
16. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (2009).
17. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 41 (1988) (noting that a Court
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Nevertheless, Supreme Court constitutional opinions often
pretend that answers are obvious.18 One might think the Justices
would have good reason to resist such rhetorical confidence.19 After
all, they hear the hardest constitutional cases, cases that divide
state and lower federal courts and often the Justices themselves.20
And yet, though the Justices frequently decide prominent constitutional cases by a 5-4 vote, they often couch their constitutional
arguments as manifestly “correct,” usually over colleagues’ strenuous objections.21 Put differently, Justices sometimes write their
opinions as though the score were 100-0, even when in fact it is
more like 51-49.22
Rhetorical certainty is nothing new in the U.S. legal system. We
expect such confidence from lawyers,23 who have a professional
obligation to represent their clients’ interests zealously.24 Of course,
good lawyers craft nuanced, sophisticated arguments and even
concede points when necessary, but they usually try to marshal the
strongest evidence in their favor and destroy their opponents’ most
important arguments and facts.25 The Justices, however, are not
advocates bound by the same rules, but they often behave like they
are, asserting the manifest correctness of their position and the
ruling cannot “quiet a constitutional debate”).
18. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 59 (“Judicial opinions are notoriously — even comically —
unequivocal.”); Levinson, supra note 5, at 188-89 (“I am always struck when opposing views
are airily dismissed as, in one of my favorite judicial phrases, ‘without merit.’ ”).
19. Cf. Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 411 (“How could the seemingly intractable legal
questions be resolved so resolutely?”).
20. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 59-60.
21. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 188-89.
22. A case may be 51-49 in that 100 reasonable judges would split 51-49 on the issue, each
believing firmly in the correctness of his vote. It also could be 51-49 in that a judge might only
be 51 percent sure that she has reached the correct outcome. See, e.g., Brad Snyder, The
Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to
Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1188 n.235 (2010) (quoting Justice Brandeis’s
statement “that the difficulty with this place is that if you’re only fifty-five percent convinced
of a proposition, you have to act and vote as if you were one hundred percent convinced”). In
both instances, the case can fairly be called “difficult,” either because it has divided
reasonable people of good faith or because complicated evidence points in opposing directions
(or often both).
23. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 153 (2010) (explaining that it is often in
lawyers’ professional interest to exude confidence).
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2002).
25. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 114.

674

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:667

illogic or disingenuousness of the other side.26 These opinions can be
rigorous and even persuasive, and yet in many instances, their selfcertainty does not ring true.27
This is the first Article to explore the many explanations for and
implications of this rhetoric of constitutional absolutism. By
“constitutional absolutism,” I refer to the contention that a particular constitutional statement is either absolutely true or false (not to
a political theory of despotism, which the Constitution, by any sane
reading, forbids). Whether in majority, concurring, or dissenting
opinions, Justices utilizing this rhetoric insist that a case has only
one possible correct constitutional answer, despite substantial
evidence supporting different possible outcomes. Justices employing
absolutist rhetoric thus often depict a case as easier than it is. They
also tend to brush off contrary precedents, arguments, and facts
without seriously engaging with them.
Given that various legal realists and other scholars have long
contended that law often does not yield certain answers,28 this
persistent rhetorical performance seems strange, especially in
Supreme Court constitutional cases. Such cases, after all, tend to be
among the most deeply contested cases in our judicial system.
Nevertheless, various explanations—strategic, institutional, and
psychological—help make sense of it. From a strategic standpoint,
absolutist rhetoric reflects the Justices’ efforts to legitimize a
decision to society.29 Constitutional law, on the whole, is engaged in
a continuing dialectic with a broader, extrajudicial constitutional
culture, and the Justices, conscious of this relationship, seek to sell
their constitutional vision to the general public.30 Relatedly, by
insisting that the law is clear, the Justices defend their holdings
26. For an amusing spoof of this tone, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
27. See Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 413.
28. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 126; JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 5-12 (1930) (attacking the notion that law yields certain answers); KARL LLEWELLYN,
THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 73 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989)
(arguing that legal certainty does not exist and attacking opinions dressed up in the “garb of
certainty”).
29. Cf. Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 424.
30. See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2008); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002
Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 8 (2003).
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against the countermajoritarian concern that a small number of
unelected Justices can impose their will on the country.31 If the
Constitution commands a certain outcome, then judges are not
imposing their normative predilections but rather are merely
following the law’s clear instructions. In this way, absolutist
rhetoric can also advance a formalist conception of law that
presupposes objective answers to constitutional questions, rather
than malleable, judge-made standards.
Other factors also explain the phenomenon. Institutional
structures, both inside and outside the judiciary, help shape the
Court’s practices. Perhaps even more importantly, psychological
research suggests that most humans, including judges, are subject
to overconfidence and confirmation bias, so that they unconsciously—but confidently—process information to reinforce their
preexisting worldviews.32 The Justices’ own past experiences as
advocates also help shape their rhetorical choices. Having spent
decades perfecting adversarial argumentation, some Justices
naturally draft their opinions in the same style.33
From these perspectives, we can better understand why the
Justices often pretend that constitutional answers are easy, but
rather than taking this practice for granted, we should also explore
its implications. The rhetoric of constitutional absolutism certainly
has costs. For example, absolutist rhetoric signals that a given
case’s losers are not just wrong, but fundamentally misguided about
the country’s core principles. Losing litigants, then, are cast as
outsiders, alienating them and encouraging them to retort with
their own incendiary constitutional rhetoric. This rhetorical cycle
not only may contribute to a broader dysfunctional political culture,
but it also can ironically undermine the Court’s legitimacy. If
constitutional losers believe that the Court fails to treat their
arguments with respect, they are more likely to dismiss the majority
coalition as partisan hacks. Absolutist rhetoric also sends the
misleading message that constitutional issues are easy. This
misperception may not be a great tragedy, but it perpetuates the
31. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (Yale Univ. Press
2d ed. 1986).
32. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 23, at 153; infra Part II.C.
33. See infra Part II.C.4.
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false impression that the Constitution embodies a single set of
norms, when in fact it is multi-faceted, containing numerous,
sometimes conflicting, values.
Absolutist rhetoric also produces some benefits. The federal
judiciary’s power to coerce other actors stems not from political
accountability but from its authority to say what the law is. One
reason why people may accept these judicial pronouncements is that
they ostensibly reflect the rule of law. However honest, more
equivocal reasoning would suggest that a judicial holding is not
guided by the rule of law and might thereby undermine a crucial
source of the judiciary’s authority. Moreover, some cases demand
that the Court speak with certainty to encourage societal acceptance. Wavering opinions in Brown v. Board of Education34 or
Loving v. Virginia,35 for instance, may have undermined the moral
force of those important rulings.
On balance, the costs of absolutist rhetoric likely outweigh its
benefits in most cases. Significantly, more conciliatory, humble
language could usually achieve many of absolutist rhetoric’s benefits
without imposing its costs.36 To be sure, more equivocal language
would not have been appropriate in Brown or Loving, but few cases
demand such unanimity and moral conviction. Even Brown’s
unanimous rejection of segregation was conspicuously devoid of
strong rhetoric, in large part because Chief Justice Warren did not
want to enflame the opposition’s passions any more than
necessary.37
This Article focuses on Supreme Court rhetoric in constitutional
cases. Judges undoubtedly overstate their cases in many other tribunals and other kinds of cases,38 but Supreme Court constitutional
decisions raise unique questions. Unlike many other tribunals, the
Supreme Court’s judgment is final, so its claim to absolutism may
be more plausible than other courts’. Moreover, whereas Congress
can alter statutes when it dislikes the Court’s interpretation,39 the
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
36. See infra Part IV.
37. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 198.
38. See Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 414 (calling judicial overstatement “the
predominant, albeit unofficial, mode of judicial reasoning” in America).
39. See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
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Court’s constitutional decisions usually persevere unless the Court
itself revisits a decision. Furthermore, although the stakes in
statutory cases can also be very high, constitutional litigation often
has especially high cultural stakes.40 Accordingly, constitutional
opinions are part of a broader constitutional conversation about
national identity and often attract disproportionate attention from
the media and the general public.41 Finally, the Constitution the
Court seeks to expound is less determinate than most statutes and
agency regulations, rendering it more open to an array of interpretive methods.42 Of course, plenty of statutes are also under-determinate, but the Constitution is often even more so.43 The great irony,
then, is that Justices in these cases confidently proclaim easy
answers to the most contestable legal questions.
One should not overstate the importance of rhetoric. The
substance of the Court’s decision usually matters more than its
language, and a change in judicial rhetoric will not substantially
alter the republic’s fate. That said, rhetoric also goes ignored too
often, especially given the country’s recent poisonous political
atmosphere. Attention to tone will not solve all of our problems, but
it will make us more conscious of the ways we interact with each
other.
Indeed, constitutional rhetoric is a special form of political
discourse because the idea of being American is interwoven with
constitutional principles.44 As Professor Sanford Levinson puts it,
“Veneration of the Constitution has become a central ... aspect of the
American political tradition.”45 The Constitution, indeed, is the
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009).
40. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2006) (discussing
how developments in constitutional law impact culture). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2000) (arguing that some “superstatutes” have quasi-constitutional significance).
41. Cf. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations
of the Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 352-53, 359 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995)
(noting that constitutional cases involving abortion and flag burning received “very
prominent” media coverage).
42. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”).
43. See STRAUSS, supra note 9, at 7-8.
44. See LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 7.
45. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“secular religion of the American republic.”46 Just as much theology
emanates from a central text or texts, so too does much of our
national identity and governmental practices grow out of our
constitutional understandings. Also like religion, our constitutional
values are sometimes as much a source of strife as unification.47
Within our broader national constitutional discussion, the Court’s
constitutional pronouncements are of special interest. The Supreme
Court enjoys a crucial position in declaring constitutional meaning
in our democratic system. Perhaps Alexis de Tocqueville overstated
the matter when he claimed that most American political questions
are ultimately resolved as judicial questions,48 but today’s Court has
firmly asserted its prerogative to determine constitutional meaning
in a variety of important areas.49 Popular visions of the Constitution
can help shape the content of the law,50 but it is the prerogative of
the judicial department to say what the law is.51 Because Supreme
Court constitutional decisions are often central to this broader
national debate about constitutional meaning, they are also at the
center of this study.
Part I of this Article opens with a brief discussion of absolutist
language in the Constitution itself and then focuses on the Justices’
use of absolutist rhetoric in constitutional cases with plausible
arguments on either side.52 Part II considers why the Justices resort
46. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 24 (1975).
47. See LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 15-16.
48. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Arlington House 1966) (1835) (“Scarcely any question arises in the United States which does
not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate.”); Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political
Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485
(2004) (arguing that de Tocqueville was incorrect and that many important early constitutional controversies were not settled by the judiciary).
49. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
50. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 107 (2004) (explaining how in popular constitutionalism, “final interpretive
authority rests with the people themselves”); Post, supra note 30, at 76 (“[T]he Court plainly
views constitutional culture as a legitimate and necessary source for the creation of constitutional law ... the beliefs and convictions of that culture importantly shape the content of the
Court’s understanding.”).
51. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
52. This Article is not an empirical study, though one could imagine a variety of related
empirical projects exploring, inter alia, how often we encounter such rhetoric in Supreme
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to absolutist rhetoric, examining strategic, institutional, and psychological explanations. Part III explores the costs and benefits of this
rhetoric, as well as some tensions with other judicial practices. Part
IV argues that the costs of absolutist rhetoric usually outweigh the
benefits and proposes a more nuanced, conciliatory constitutional
dialogue.
I. THE RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL ABSOLUTISM
A. Absolutist Constitutional Provisions
In one sense, it is no surprise that the Court would speak about
the Constitution in absolute terms, because the Constitution itself
uses absolutist rhetoric. Constitutions generally may be prone to
absolutism, because their job is to lay down broad rules of general
applicability, not to resolve the hard cases that arise.53 The First
Amendment, for instance, stipulates that “Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech.”54 This language is absolutist; by its own terms, it allows no exceptions. Of course, the Free
Speech Clause in practice is less absolute, notwithstanding Justice
Black’s protestations to the contrary.55 Well-settled Supreme Court
doctrine allows for abridgments of certain kinds of speech, such as
incitements to violence, fighting words, obscenity, and child
Court opinions, which Justices use such rhetoric most frequently, which issues most
commonly provoke it, whether it has recently become more common, and whether it occurs
more often in unanimous or closely divided cases. One might also examine separately different
sorts of absolutist rhetoric—disrespectful language, sarcastic language, dismissal of
counterarguments, certainty of tone, and so on. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Most
Sarcastic Justice, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 215, 215-217 (2015) (offering empirical evidence
demonstrating that Justice Scalia is the most sarcastic Justice). Each of these approaches
would likely yield very interesting insights. That said, while an empirical project could better
determine how often and in what ways the Justices use absolutist rhetoric, there is no doubt
that such rhetoric exists, and it is this project’s aim to examine explanations for and
implications of the phenomenon more generally.
53. See ARTHUR P. POLEY, THE FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH
EMPIRE: THEIR ORIGIN, NATURE, AND DEVELOPMENT 125-30 (1913) (explaining that written
constitutions typically lay down fundamental principles).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 75 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he First Amendment rights involved here[ ] were unequivocally set out by the Founders
in our Bill of Rights in the very plainest of language, and they should not be diluted by ‘tests’
that obliterate them.”).
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pornography.56 A similar disconnect exists between the Contracts
Clause and cases construing that provision.57 These very disconnects
between language and doctrine highlight that judges do not always
take absolutist language seriously.58
Indeed, whereas some foreign constitutions include clauses providing for reasonable limitations on the exercise of individual
rights,59 the U.S. Supreme Court instead has fashioned such limitations itself.60 Of course, we do accept some clear provisions. For
example, the President must be at least thirty-five years old,61 and
each state must have two senators.62 Nevertheless, as the First
Amendment and the Contracts Clause examples demonstrate, a constitutional provision’s textual clarity does not always determine the
relative importance of text in the interpretation of that provision.
B. Judicial Absolutism
Against this backdrop, it is strange that Justices interpreting the
document would insist that its answers are clear, and yet, they often
do. Indeed, the practice is largely taken for granted,63 even though
56. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934)
(holding that a state’s suspension of creditors’ remedies did not violate the Contracts Clause).
58. One might contend that the language “abridging the freedom of speech” contemplates
some limitations on speech that different language—such as “Congress shall make no law
abridging speech”—might not. See William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech
Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 118 (1982). The Court, however, has not hooked its free speech
doctrine on this textual nuance.
59. See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.) (permitting “such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”);
S. AFR. CONST. § 36, 1996 (providing for balancing of the right and the nature of the
limitation).
60. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“Like most rights, the
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”); Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth
and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 401 (2008)
(arguing that the lack of a limitations clause in the U.S. Constitution has not “resulted in
rights being deemed absolute but rather in the judicial implication of limits”).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
62. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
63. See Stephen A. Siegel, How Many Critiques Must Historians Write?, 45 TULSA L. REV.
823, 824 (2010) (“[T]he norms of judicial-opinion writing require judges to assert certainty
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many cases that proceed through the litigation process without settling raise difficult questions over which reasonable people can
differ.64 Given that the certiorari process favors issues that have
divided the lower courts, Supreme Court cases in particular tend to
be challenging. Furthermore, unlike some statutory and administrative cases, constitutional cases usually lack the kind of technical
answers about which accomplished lawyers are more likely to
agree.65 To be sure, there are some constitutional cases which most
observers would consider “easy,”66 but even if we can agree in principle on the existence of such cases, it is extraordinarily difficult to
offer formal criteria by which to determine what constitutes an
“easy” case.67 Nevertheless, Justices often dismiss opposing constitutional views as “frivolous” or “without merit,” despite colorable—even persuasive—arguments to the contrary.68 Indeed, this
practice is hardly confined to unanimous cases; majority and
dissenting opinions both summarily reject arguments that another
opinion found convincing.69
To be clear, an absolutist opinion is not necessarily a bad one. An
absolutist opinion typically overstates its claims and fails to give
fair hearing to arguments and evidence on the other side, but it can
nevertheless be rigorous and coherent. For all its flaws, an absolutist opinion can function well according to its own internal logic.

about their decisions.”).
64. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (explaining that cases that fail to settle are most often those “where
the dispute is most problematic”).
65. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 67 (2012).
66. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67. See Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 357 (1987).
68. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics:
The Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 195 n.82 (2001)
(“[T]he flip side of the point that a person viewing the law internally can see arguments as
meritorious that others think utterly frivolous is that one can recognize and proclaim
arguments as frivolous that others think are entirely meritorious.”); Levinson, supra note 5,
at 189 (noting how often courts airily dismiss opposing views as “without merit”).
69. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 375 (1997) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s First Amendment argument as “meritless”); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288-89 n.14 (1983) (rejecting as “meritless” an Eighth Amendment
argument advanced by four dissenters); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 68, at 195 n.82.
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“Absolutism” also is distinct from “civility.” Although some
judicial rhetoric may occasionally fall below basic standards of
decency, constitutional rhetoric can be overconfident without being
obnoxious. The judicial opinion is a genre long accustomed to
restraint. Perhaps Justice Scalia’s caustic flourishes sometimes
cross this boundary,70 but by most accounts, his colleagues usually
take it in stride, and the Court remains, more or less, a collegial
place.71 Rhetoric might be simultaneously absolutist and uncivil,
and absolutism might lead towards uncivil discourse (and vice
versa), but the focus here is judicial opinions, which, while intellectually dismissive of differing views, usually follow the genre’s formal
conventions.
Though absolutist rhetoric about the Constitution appears in
numerous cases, I focus here on five kinds of constitutional cases
lacking obvious answers. These include a case relying on originalist
arguments to announce a new constitutional right; a case presenting
a conflict between constitutional rights; a case overturning precedent; a case identifying a national consensus to justify invalidating
a state law; and a case resting upon a highly contested view of
crucial legislative facts. Neither the examples nor the categories are
exhaustive. Nor are the examples absolutist in identical ways,
though in most of them, the authoring Justice over-simplifies the
law or the facts, fails to wrestle seriously with counterarguments,
and writes as though the outcome is obvious. In short, these cases
demonstrate that Justices sometimes adopt the most certain language, even when the answer seems contestable.

70. See, e.g., Brett Logiurato, Justice Scalia Used the Term “Argle-Bargle” in a Scathing,
Condescending DOMA Rant, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 26, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/justice-scalias-doma-dissent-argle-bargle-2013-6 [http://perma.cc/5G5-BR5C]
(discussing Justice Scalia’s scornful dissent in United States v. Windsor).
71. See Robyn Hagan Cain, Justice Kagan Talks Cameras in the Supreme Court,
Collegiality, FINDLAW BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/
2011/08/justice-kagan-talks-cameras-in-the-supreme-court-collegiality.html [http://perma.cc/
BAP4-N8RV] (discussing the “warmth and collegiality among the justices”). But see infra
notes 413-14 and accompanying text (noting that Justice Scalia’s sharp rhetoric has reportedly alienated some of his colleagues).
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1. Heller, History, and a New Individual Right
One would think a case relying on historical sources to announce
a previously unrecognized constitutional right might demand
caution rather than bluster, but the Court in District of Columbia
v. Heller defended its holding as though no other outcome were
possible.72 The case considered the constitutionality of the District
of Columbia’s handgun ban.73 Challengers argued that the law
violated the Second Amendment.74 The District argued, among other
things, that the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms
extends only to militia service.75 Although commentators and
activists had written extensively about the Second Amendment
prior to Heller, the Court itself had said very little.76
Interestingly, both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice
Stevens’s dissent engaged in originalist analysis to determine
whether the Second Amendment protected the right to bear arms
unconnected to militia service.77 Given the Court’s 5-4 split78 and the
complications inherent in originalist inquiries, equivocal opinions
would have seemed appropriate. However, even though the majority
and dissent understood that history very differently,79 each insisted
that its interpretation was manifestly correct.
Indeed, Justices Scalia and Stevens both presented their historical arguments as though the evidence all stacked up clearly on one
side. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion vigorously rejected the
argument that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause—“A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
72. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
73. Id. at 573.
74. Id. at 575-76.
75. Id. at 577.
76. But see United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
77. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-605; id. at 637, 640-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 572 (majority opinion).
79. One potential explanation for the discrepancy is that whereas Justice Scalia was
searching for the text’s original public meaning, Justice Stevens was more concerned with the
purpose underlying the text. See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 957 (2009). However, it is also important to note that
the separate opinions were not so methodologically pure. In fact, though Justice Stevens did
examine the purposes behind the provision, he also devoted significant attention to evidence
of the text’s public meaning. See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
329, 338 (2013).
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State”—limited the scope of its operative clause—“the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”80 Justice
Scalia cited some plausible period sources for this contention,81 but
Justice Stevens in dissent also cited plausible sources for the
opposite contention that a provision’s prefatory clause “both sets
forth the object of the Amendment and informs the meaning of the
remainder of its text.”82 Despite complicated evidence on both sides,
Justice Scalia never doubted the correctness of his position,
announcing categorically that “a prefatory clause does not limit or
expand the scope of the operative clause.”83 His language admitted
no complication or doubt.
Justice Scalia was similarly confident that the “natural meaning”
of the phrase “keep and bear arms” “in no way connotes participation in a structured military organization.”84 The dissent, in fact,
identified several eighteenth-century state declarations of rights
that used the phrase as a term of art implying “military uses of
firearms.”85 The majority nevertheless brushed off these arguments,
stating “[t]here is nothing to this.”86 Thus, despite evidentiary complications and contradictions, Justice Scalia’s opinion reads as though
the case were easy and the dissenters hopelessly misguided. Indeed,
his rhetoric did little to hide his disdain, dismissing the dissent’s
arguments as “worthy of the Mad Hatter”87 and “[g]rotesque.”88 Of
course, none of this is to say that the Heller majority necessarily got
the case wrong, but rather to point out its absolutist tone in a case
which divided both commentators and the Court itself.89

80. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
81. Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
82. Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 584.
85. See id. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 591 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 589.
88. Id. at 587; see also Guinier, supra note 30, at 110 (noting that Justice Scalia in Heller
“speaks frankly, memorably, and with absolute certainty about the very meaning of our
democracy”).
89. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,
95 VA. L. REV. 253, 266 (2009) (“If there is a reasonable case for the majority’s interpretation
of the Second Amendment, there is also a reasonable case for the position taken by the
dissenters.”).
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Justice Stevens’s dissenting language is more diplomatic but
similarly self-assured. In his view, the Second Amendment’s
language was directed at an “overriding concern about the potential
threat to state sovereignty that a federal standing army would pose,
and a desire to protect the States’ militias as the means by which to
guard against that danger.”90 The majority’s evidence, the dissent
contended, “offer[ed] little support for the Court’s conclusion,”91
which created a “dramatic upheaval in the law.”92 Given the majority’s “strained and unpersuasive reading” of the relevant evidence,93
Justice Stevens “could not possibly conclude” that the Second
Amendment removed elected officials’ ability to regulate guns.94
Both sides’ strong language belies the fact that the Heller holding
was rather limited. Indeed, though the Court recognized a right that
the dissent would have denied, it also made clear, albeit with no
supporting argument, that certain regulations impinging on the
right to bear arms would almost certainly be constitutional.95
Interestingly, then, the Court’s absolutist rhetoric masked a rather
modest, albeit controversial, holding.
2. Rosenberger and Conflicting Constitutional Rights
One might also think that cases presenting colliding constitutional principles are inherently difficult, but, once again, we see
Justices on a divided Court taking strong stances. In Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a university practice denying an evangelical
Christian student publication the same subsidy for printing costs
that it provided to other student publications.96 The case squarely
pitted free speech against Establishment Clause norms. On the one
hand, the policy denied the Christian publication the same funding

90. Heller, 554 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 662.
92. Id. at 639.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 680.
95. See id. at 626-28 (majority opinion) (discussing various limitations of the Second
Amendment).
96. 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995).
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for speech that it provided other student groups,97 thereby manifesting unconstitutional content and viewpoint discrimination.98 On the
other hand, governmental funding of evangelical publications would
violate the longstanding prohibition on the use of “public funds for
the direct subsidization of preaching the word.”99
Rather than candidly acknowledging that the case was difficult
precisely because these two important norms collided, both the
majority and the dissent treated this like an easy case. In vindicating the publication’s free speech claim, Justice Kennedy emphasized
that “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech
based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”100
Viewed solely through the lens of free speech, the University’s policy
unquestionably discriminated against the religious publication. As
for the contention that university funding to an evangelical
publication would violate the Establishment Clause, Justice
Kennedy found that the “central lesson” of earlier cases was that
government programs neutral towards religion would be upheld,
and therefore, free speech norms clearly trumped Establishment
Clause concerns in such contexts.101 On Justice Kennedy’s reading,
then, the free speech violation was egregious and the Establishment
Clause issue was virtually nonexistent.
Justice Souter viewed the case entirely differently, focusing on
the government aid to religion, which, he emphasized, is “categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause.”102 Whereas Justice
Kennedy had been untroubled by a “neutral” subsidy,103 Justice
Souter insisted that the Establishment Clause’s scope was broader,
arguing “if the Clause was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was
meant to bar this use of public money.”104 To bolster this view,
Souter provided a cursory summary of the early history of antiestablishment norms in America, concluding that the First Amendment must have embodied Thomas Jefferson and James Madison’s
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 827.
See id. at 830-31.
See id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 828 (majority opinion).
Id. at 839.
Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 839 (majority opinion).
Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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opposition to public support for religion.105 Justice Souter’s historical
conclusions are plausible, but so are alternative interpretations,
especially given that some New England states during the early
republic retained state establishments of religion.106
Only Justice O’Connor’s concurrence acknowledged the difficulty
of the case. She emphasized the dueling constitutional norms at
stake, writing that “[t]his case lies at the intersection of the principle of government neutrality and the prohibition on state funding
of religious activities.”107 Whereas the majority and dissent had each
dismissed the other’s line of reasoning, Justice O’Connor noted that
“[w]hen two bedrock principles so conflict, understandably neither
can provide the definitive answer.”108 In a thinly veiled critique of
her colleagues, O’Connor continued that “[r]eliance on categorical
platitudes is unavailing.”109 Whereas the majority and dissent had
offered more absolutist readings of the First Amendment, Justice
O’Connor insisted that the analysis required something more subtle
than a First Amendment master norm. “Resolution,” she argued,
“instead depends on the hard task of judging—sifting through the
details and determining whether the challenged program offends
the Establishment Clause. Such judgment requires courts to draw
lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each
case.”110
Justices Kennedy and Souter thus each took a more absolutist
approach to the case, but Justice O’Connor emphasized the constitutional tensions. This approach eschewed the rhetorical confidence
of the majority and dissent. Instead, it accepted the legitimacy of
competing First Amendment norms to focus on the context of the
particular case.111 Nevertheless, the fact that Justice O’Connor
wrote only for herself highlights the apparent appeal of absolutism
in even the hardest cases.
105. Id. at 868-72.
106. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 164 (2007).
107. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Cf. Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines,
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 499-500 (2006) (discussing an approach to colliding constitutional doctrines).
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3. Citizens United and Overturning Precedent
Absolutist rhetoric would also seem unconvincing when the Court
overturns precedent. After all, in such instances, the Court is disagreeing not just with lower courts but with itself. Such cases, one
would think, would invite a Justice to concede that a question is
difficult, but, once again, the Court sometimes uses unequivocal
language.
Citizens United v. FEC provides a recent example.112 In that case,
the Court struck down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA), holding that restrictions on independent
expenditures by corporations’ general treasuries for election-related
speech violated the First Amendment.113 Despite a vigorous fourJustice dissent and the fact that the Court had to overrule both
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce114 and portions of McConnell v. FEC,115 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, treated
this as an easy case.
Though long and complicated, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
Court boiled down to his conclusion that BCRA enacted a “vast”
scheme of “censorship.”116 Proceeding with great confidence, the
Court brushed away arguments in favor of upholding the restriction.
For example, though the Court in Austin had upheld prohibitions on
corporations’ independent expenditures, Justice Kennedy rejected
this precedent as anomalous,117 largely because the government
defended Austin on a different ground than the Court had relied
upon in that decision.118 On closer inspection, the Court’s justification for ignoring Austin seems dubious. Indeed, Justice Kennedy
himself was one of the authors of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,119
which upheld Roe v. Wade’s120 core holding in rather absolutist
112. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
113. Id.
114. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
115. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
116. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354.
117. See id. at 348 (“No case before Austin had held that Congress could prohibit
independent expenditures for political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”).
118. More specifically, whereas Austin had rested primarily on an antidistortion rationale,
the government sought to uphold BCRA because it helped combat corruption. See id. at 363.
119. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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terms,121 while departing substantially from Roe’s rationale.122
Casey’s controversial reaffirmation of Roe, however, did not stop
Justice Kennedy from finding Austin’s precedential value largely
“diminished” by the fact that the government sought to defend it
with different reasoning.123
More importantly, the Court failed to engage seriously with the
dissent’s concern that Congress has a “compelling constitutional
basis” to guard against the appearance of and potential for corruption in local and national elections.124 Justice Kennedy concluded,
without any factual citations, “that independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption
or the appearance of corruption,”125 even though, as the dissent
pointed out, Congress had crafted BCRA with a “virtual mountain
of research on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to
avert.”126 Justice Kennedy further responded that the appearance of
corporate influence over governmental policy will not cause the
electorate to lose faith in democracy, but, once again, he cited no
evidence supporting his view.127 The Court, in other words, rejected
the most important argument in support of the challenged regulation by ignoring reams of contrary evidence and making assertions
without evidence to support them.128
None of this is to say that the dissent was not also guilty of
absolutist rhetoric when it accused the majority of repudiating
“common sense.”129 Nor is it to say that the Court did not have
legitimate arguments on its side. The majority was correct when it

121. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (“[T]he Court’s interpretation of the Constitution call[s] the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”).
122. Id. at 846, 851-53 (upholding the core of Roe’s protection of abortion rights but
replacing Roe’s privacy justification with a reproductive autonomy and equality rationale).
123. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363.
124. See id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 357 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 360 (majority opinion) (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore,
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”).
128. See Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 295, 298 (2011) (noting that Justice
Kennedy seemed to believe that the facts were irrelevant to the analysis in Citizens United).
129. See Citizens United, 550 U.S. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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contended that the law did “muffle” some speech.130 It was similarly
correct that BCRA targeted political speech, which enjoys special
status under the First Amendment.131 And it also made the
legitimate point that the government’s interest in campaign finance
regulations is undermined, at least in part, by the frequency with
which many political contributors circumvent such regulations.132
These are powerful points in the majority’s favor. Nevertheless,
even in articulating these arguments, the Court was prone to
overstatement. For example, it asserted that “political speech must
prevail against laws that would suppress it,”133 thus seeming to
suggest, contrary to longstanding precedent, that even laws narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests would be
invalid. Justice Kennedy likely did not mean to go quite so far: he
later cited the test for strict scrutiny.134 His language, however, is
symptomatic of an opinion that celebrates a single constitutional
principle so vigorously that it myopically ignores competing interests.135
A more equivocal opinion could have still asserted the same
arguments and come to the same outcome while engaging more
seriously with counterarguments. In particular, a less absolutist
opinion could have acknowledged the very real problem of corporate
influence in our policy-making system.136 The Court defined “corruption” very narrowly, encompassing only actual quid pro quo
exchanges,137 and thus avoided addressing the larger, persistent
130. See id. at 354 (majority opinion) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257 (2003)).
131. Id. at 336-41.
132. Id. at 364 (“Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers find ways to
circumvent campaign finance laws.”).
133. Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
134. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)) (noting that strict
scrutiny permits only laws that are narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental
interests).
135. See id. at 339 (“Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could
repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process.”).
136. See Teachout, supra note 128, at 297.
137. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356-59 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption,
that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”); Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption
and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (2013) (arguing that the
“main front in the battle over the constitutionality of campaign finance laws” is “defining
corruption”).
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problem of a campaign finance system that grants the very wealthy,
including some large corporations, extraordinary and disproportionate access to legislators, thereby (at least arguably) skewing policy
to suit their interests.138 By brushing off the asserted danger that
large corporate campaign contributions can effectively purchase
favorable policies (without actually meeting the legal definition of
quid pro quo corruption), the Court failed to give a fair hearing to
the government’s argument that the dangers of corruption constituted a compelling governmental interest justifying intrusion into
corporate speech rights.139 In short, the Court acted as though the
case were easy, extolling the right at stake in grandiose terms,
rejecting inconvenient precedent, and giving short shrift to arguments and evidence that complicated the picture.
4. Graham, National Consensus, and the Countermajoritarian
Problem
The Court also sometimes uses absolutist rhetoric when it seeks
to justify its decision to overturn democratically enacted laws. It
sometimes does so by asserting that a national consensus has
emerged against a challenged practice, thereby suggesting that the
challenged law actually lacks majoritarian support.140 Given that a
national consensus is factually difficult to establish and that
challenged practices usually enjoy some democratic support, one
might think that the Court should proceed cautiously, especially
when the evidence is equivocal. Nevertheless, once again, it often
proceeds with great confidence.
This inquiry into the existence of a national consensus arises
frequently in Eighth Amendment cases examining whether a particular criminal punishment is “cruel and unusual.”141 For example,
138. See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 128, at 297 (noting that Citizens United “suffers from
a failure to describe real pressures [on politicians and their staffers], and the way those
pressures directly interfere with representative government in devastating ways”).
139. The Court also could have reached the same outcome on much narrower grounds. See
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356-61.
140. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57
UCLA L. REV. 365, 388-400 (2009) (arguing that the Court engages in state counting in a
variety of doctrinal contexts beyond the Eighth Amendment).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Lain, supra note 140, at 366-68.
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in Graham v. Florida, the Court considered an Eighth Amendment
challenge to Florida’s imposition of a sentence of life in prison
without parole for a juvenile found guilty of a non-homicide crime.142
The Court, per Justice Kennedy, ruled for the petitioner, categorically proclaiming that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition
of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide.”143
In defending this holding, the Court placed substantial weight on
its conclusion that “a national consensus has developed against” the
practice.144 This conclusion, however, was more contestable than the
Court made it seem. Indeed, at the time of the Court’s decision,
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia did permit sentences of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.145
The Court tried to minimize the significance of this evidence,
contending that “[t]here are measures of consensus other than
legislation.”146 However, in previous Eighth Amendment cases, the
Court had relied heavily on its survey of state statutes. For example, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice Kennedy, again writing for the
Court, emphasized that forty-four states had not made child rape a
capital offense when he confidently announced that “there is a
national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child
rape.”147
To be sure, the Graham majority’s survey of actual sentencing
practices did suggest that life imprisonment without parole was a
relatively rare punishment for juveniles convicted of non-homicide
offenses.148 Moreover, earlier cases did not indicate that state statutes were the only measure of a national consensus.149 Nevertheless,
although Graham offered some plausible evidence for its conclusion,
it also failed to adequately justify the methodological inconsistencies
142. 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010).
143. Id. at 82.
144. Id. at 67 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
145. See id. at 62.
146. Id.
147. 554 U.S. 407, 423, 434 (2008); see also Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference:
The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2010).
148. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 63-67.
149. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 423; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566-67 (2005);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
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of its approach.150 It similarly had no answer for the dissent’s contention that a rarely imposed punishment reflects consensus that it
should be rarely imposed, not that “the punishment is one the
Nation abhors.”151 Furthermore, instead of explaining why sentencing practices were more indicative of a national consensus than
state statutes, the majority merely asserted that argument as
fact.152 Graham, thus, simultaneously adopted a confident tone and
failed to wrestle with difficult counterarguments that might have
cast doubt on its conclusions.
The Court’s partial reliance on the ostensible existence of a
national consensus against the challenged sentence may reflect its
efforts to mitigate the countermajoritarian problem.153 After all, if
the Court strikes down a practice that is out of step with widely
accepted American norms, its action is less obviously countermajoritarian.154 To this extent, Graham’s confident rhetoric may seek to
rebut the criticism that the Court should have deferred to the state
legislature. Ironically, though, the Court’s oversimplified and
overconfident national consensus analysis hardly provides assurance that it takes the countermajoritarian concern here seriously.
None of this is to suggest that the dissent was not also guilty of
rhetorical excess. For instance, Justice Thomas criticized the Court
for “openly claim[ing] the power ... to approve or disapprove of
democratic choices in penal policy based on ... the Court’s ‘independent’ perception of how those standards should evolve.”155 The dissent
was correct, of course, that the majority did not limit its analysis to
indications of national consensus but also offered its own moral
judgment.156 However, far from being anomalous, as the dissent
suggested, such independent judgment recurs in numerous Eighth
Amendment cases.157 Justice Thomas also faulted the majority for
150. See Berger, supra note 147, at 15-16.
151. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 67 (majority opinion) (“[T]he many States that allow life without parole for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders but do not impose the punishment should not be treated as
if they have expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate.”).
153. See BICKEL, supra note 31, at 16-17.
154. Cf. Lain, supra note 140, at 369-70 (arguing that the Court counts states in numerous
doctrinal settings and that this practice reflects “the Court’s majoritarian proclivities”).
155. Id. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
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rejecting a sentencing practice that “would not have offended the
standards that prevailed at the founding,”158 even though the Eighth
Amendment has long been understood to encompass “evolving
standards of decency.”159 As in other cases, then, both the majority
and dissent used excessive rhetoric and failed to engage carefully
with the other side’s best arguments.
5. Shelby County and Supreme Court Finding of Legislative
Facts
If the Court’s idiosyncratic factual understandings played a
substantial role in Citizens United and Graham, they almost singlehandedly determined the outcome in Shelby County v. Holder.160
Constitutional law often hinges on the Justices’ conceptions of
legislative facts—that is, facts that transcend a particular dispute
and provide a foundation upon which the Court will form and apply
legal rules.161 Shelby County demonstrates how the Justices’
different factual presumptions can shape their legal views and how
the Justices can offer one-sided factual presentations that fail to do
justice to a case’s complexity.
Shelby County considered the constitutionality of section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which provided the “coverage
formula” defining “covered jurisdictions” subject to section 5.162
Under section 5 of the Act, covered jurisdictions must seek federal
approval for changes to voting procedures.163 Section 4’s coverage
formula, thus, determined which states and localities must clear
any change to voter procedures with the federal government.164
551, 568-75 (2005).
158. Graham, 560 U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion)).
160. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
161. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942); Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar
Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1998); Allison Orr Larsen,
Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1256-57 (2012).
162. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (discussing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b (2012)).
163. See id. at 2619-21 (discussing the history of the Voting Rights Act).
164. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012), invalidated by Shelby Cnty.,
133 S. Ct. 2612.
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Congress reauthorized the Act several times, but in both 1982
and 2006, its reauthorizations did not alter the coverage formula.165
Consequently, most jurisdictions covered in 1975 were also covered
in 2013, subject to certain “bail out” provisions.166 When the U.S.
Attorney General objected to voting changes proposed in Shelby
County, Alabama, on the grounds that they harmed minority
voters,167 the county, a covered jurisdiction under section 4, sued,
challenging the constitutionality of the coverage formula.168
The Supreme Court ruled in Shelby County’s favor, striking down
section 4 in its entirety.169 In so doing, the Court emphasized that in
reauthorizing the VRA in 2006 without updating the coverage
formula, Congress imposed extreme burdens on states unjustified
by current needs.170 Whereas federal intrusion into state voting
procedures may once have been necessary, the covered jurisdictions’
great strides combating racist voting practices obviated such
measures today.171
The Court’s holding thus hinged largely on its understanding of
the facts. In covered jurisdictions, Chief Justice Roberts noted,
“[v]oter turnout and registration rates [between whites and racial
minorities] now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions
of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels.”172 Indeed, the Court continued, African
Americans by 2006 were attaining political office “in record numbers,”173 further indicating that continued federal oversight of
covered jurisdictions’ election procedures was both unnecessary and
unduly intrusive. Congress, however, had reauthorized the coverage
provisions “as if nothing had changed.”174
165. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620-21.
166. Id.
167. See Joint Appendix at 115a, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96), 2012 WL
6952117 (noting that the city had not met “its burden of showing that the submitted changes
have neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect”).
168. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621-22.
169. See id. at 2631.
170. Id. at 2630-31 (asserting that it was irrational for Congress to reauthorize a coverage
formula that was based on forty-year-old data, when current statistics reflect “an entirely
different story”).
171. See id. at 2628 (“There is no longer such a disparity.”).
172. Id. at 2621 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009)).
173. Id. at 2628.
174. Id. at 2626.
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The Court’s presentation of these facts is absolutist, framed in
simple, declarative sentences as incontestable fact ineluctably
leading to a constitutional conclusion. Congress’s failure to update
the coverage formula, it emphasized, “leaves [the Court] ... with no
choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”175 Viewed solely
through the lens of these facts, the Court’s holding seems—at least
arguably—reasonable. Why should we permit continued federal
interference in state affairs when the mischief Congress sought to
remedy has largely dissipated?
The problem, of course, is that the Court’s presentation of facts is
far more controversial than its tone would suggest. As Justice
Ginsburg contended in dissent, the majority’s largely sunny view of
race relations ignored some crucial facts.176 Unlike the majority, the
dissent emphasized that minority voting patterns were healthy
in many covered jurisdictions precisely because the VRA continued
to do significant work there.177 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that
the Attorney General had rejected large numbers of proposed
changes to voting laws in covered jurisdictions, thus indicating that
“barriers to minority voting would quickly resurface were the
preclearance remedy eliminated.”178 Far from being unnecessary,
the preclearance provision continued to protect minority voters from
state and local schemes that would dilute their power.179 Justice
Ginsburg thus rejected the Chief Justice’s confident factual analysis
with her own absolutist simile: “Throwing out preclearance when it
has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you
are not getting wet.”180
The majority and dissent thus used their opinions to proclaim, in
no uncertain terms, their particular views of very complicated facts,
even though the Supreme Court is institutionally ill-equipped to

175. Id. at 2631.
176. See id. at 2635-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing congressional fact-finding
during the legislative process that revealed considerable evidence of continuing voter
discrimination).
177. See id. at 2635.
178. Id. at 2634 (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 181 (1980)).
179. See id. at 2635-36.
180. See id. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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find facts.181 Whereas the majority saw the VRA as largely unnecessary in a world without significant race-based voter discrimination,
the dissent saw the Act as essential to protect racial minorities in
covered jurisdictions from “second-generation barriers” to voting,
such as racial gerrymandering, at-large voting, and discriminatory
municipal annexation designed to decrease the impact of black
votes.182 Both sides engaged in rhetorical absolutism, trying to paint
a one-sided factual portrait, because, significantly, the legal conclusion flowed substantially from the facts.
***
Admittedly, plenty of opinions do not reflect this style.183 Absolutist language, for example, tends to appear less often in cases
involving a constitutional decision rule, in which the Court is simply
applying accepted principles from previous cases.184 Moreover, some
Justices gravitate away from it, perhaps for strategic reasons, or
perhaps simply because of personal style. As a result, some constitutional opinions are not so strongly worded, and some are likely
penned with collegiality in mind.185 Indeed, whereas some Justices,
like Justice Scalia, have a more biting style, others, like Justices
O’Connor and Breyer, more often adopt a conciliatory tone, perhaps
trying to seem moderate and pragmatic in the hopes of persuading
a swing Justice, if not in this case, then perhaps in the next one.186
Nevertheless, though the Justices collectively and individually
adopt various tones, absolutist rhetoric features prominently in
many constitutional cases.

181. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 158 (2006) (discussing judges’ “limited capacity to generate the needed
information”); Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in
a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 661-63 (1988) (discussing the physical
impossibility of courts examining an increasingly complex government).
182. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2634-35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
183. Of course, plenty of other opinions not discussed here do reflect this style.
184. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
185. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 280 (2005).
186. See id. at 283-87.
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II. EXPLANATIONS
No single theory can explain the Justices’ rhetorical styles; the
calculus differs depending on the particular Justice and case.
Nevertheless, explanations for some Justices’ use of absolutist
rhetoric can be grouped into three general categories: strategic,
institutional, and psychological. These explanations can work in
tandem or separately, depending on the case and the Justice.
Although not every explanation will apply to every case or Justice,
collectively they shed much light on the phenomenon.
A. Strategic Explanations
Some absolutist rhetoric is strategic. Justices try to use their
opinions to help steer the law in their desired direction, speaking
simultaneously to numerous audiences including lower courts,
governmental officials, parties, lawyers, law students, law professors, fellow and future Justices, the media, the general public, and
more. On this account, Justices and the law clerks who draft some
of their opinions adopt an absolutist tone to persuade other actors
of the correctness of their constitutional views.
1. Absolutism as Demosprudence
As Dean Robert Post has observed, constitutional law and
constitutional culture are “locked in a dialectical relationship, so
that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates
culture.”187 Because the Justices realize that their constitutional
views are more likely to prevail and endure if the public accepts
them, they sometimes craft their opinions with the general public
in mind.188 Justices, then, sometimes try to “court the people” to
enlist popular support for a particular constitutional vision.189 In
187. Post, supra note 30, at 8.
188. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007).
189. See Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide,
89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 545 (2009).
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this way, as Professor Lani Guinier has observed, Supreme Court
opinions can be “demosprudential,” engaged in an ongoing, albeit
forceful, conversation with the public, encouraging nonjudicial
actors to support or oppose the majority’s conclusions.190
Justices’ demosprudential efforts may be especially aggressive in
closely divided cases, when they perceive the need to rebut the other
side’s contentions.191 After all, when the Court is unanimous, that
unanimity itself sends a powerful message to the public about the
country’s constitutional norms. In such cases, additional rhetorical
force may be less necessary. However, when the Justices—and,
perhaps more importantly, large segments of society itself—disagree
on an important constitutional norm or social structure, a Justice
may deem it especially important to phrase her argument as
strongly as possible to rebut the other side.192 Somewhat paradoxically, then, Justices may be more inclined to use absolutist language
in those cases where a strong counterargument exists.
Demosprudential absolutism can invoke case-specific arguments
or appeal to broader principles about the judicial role.193 For
example, Justices sometimes craft majority opinions to seem
restrained and dissents to make the majority seem activist.194 This
kind of demosprudence roots its arguments in deeper notions of
judicial legitimacy. A dissent will likely have greater resonance if it
can persuade a large audience that the majority opinion exceeded
the judiciary’s limited role of “calling balls and strikes.”195
190. See Guinier, supra note 30, at 47-49, 57.
191. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 30, at 8-12 (discussing Justice Breyer’s powerful oral
dissent to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S.
707 (2007), challenging the fundamental legal presumptions of the majority opinion in a 5-4
decision).
192. Cf. J. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2319-20 (1997)
(noting that some constitutional cases are “really battles over social status and social
structure” with “urgency and deep symbolic meaning”).
193. But see NATHANIEL PERSILY ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 9 (2008) (“For the most part, the decisions of the Supreme Court and other
courts go unnoticed by the American public.”).
194. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008,
2019-21 (2002).
195. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges are like umpires … and I will remember
that it's my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”).
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Justices also sometimes aim their demosprudence at specific
audiences. Cognizant that the media is a particularly effective
intermediary between the Court and the public,196 Justices sometimes seem to direct portions of their opinion to reporters. Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, for example, rings
with self-certainty, seemingly directed at a broad lay audience.197
Lawrence, which invalidated Texas’s criminal prohibition of samesex sodomy,198 opens with an ode to liberty directed at the general
public:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home,
where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom
extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.199

Justice Kennedy continues with further language emphasizing that
the challenged law violated the equality and dignity of homosexuals,200 thereby subjecting all homosexuals to a deeply offensive
stigma.201
Lawrence’s language is consciously demosprudential, both invoking and prompting social change. The Court justified its decision
partially by detailing changed societal attitudes towards homosexuality,202 but its celebration of liberty and dignity also likely played
some role in helping bring about more momentous changes.203 Just
196. See, e.g., Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 41, at 353 (describing media coverage as a
“crucial variable” in shaping public awareness of Supreme Court decisions).
197. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex
Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 817 (2003).
198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575, 578-79.
199. Id. at 562.
200. Id. at 567-68 (“[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”).
201. Id. at 575 (“The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial.”).
202. Id. at 573.
203. See James W. Soutenborough et al., Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court
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over a decade later, same-sex couples enjoy the right to marry in
well over thirty states and the District of Columbia.204
Indeed, Lawrence’s language conveys a powerful narrative of
newly recognized civil liberties and cultural tolerance, adopting an
absolutist tone that rejects alternative outcomes. Such absolutist
language not only highlights the human costs of anti-sodomy laws
but also helped the Court confidently overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,
which had upheld a similar Georgia anti-sodomy statute.205
Although Bowers was incompatible with most Americans’ values by
2003,206 the mere existence of that precedent made Lawrence a more
difficult case than it otherwise would have been.207 Justice Kennedy,
then, used absolutist rhetoric to persuade the American people that
our nation’s fundamental constitutional norms required overruling
existing precedent and striking down the Texas statute.208 The
rhetoric resonated in the mainstream media. For example, The New
York Times reported on the Court’s “sweeping declaration of
constitutional liberty” that “effectively apologiz[ed]” for Bowers,209
which had “demean[ed] the lives of homosexual persons.”210
Justice Scalia used absolutist language in Heller to similar
demosprudential effect, directing portions of his opinions to gunrights advocates likely to applaud the decision.211 For instance, in

Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419, 419 (2006)
(“Lawrence ... appears to be playing a central role in shaping the national debate over gay
rights and same-sex marriage.”); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal
Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 877 (2001) (“[L]aw
cannot liberalize unless public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be influenced by
changes in the law.”).
204. See David A. Graham, Gaming Out the End of the Gay-Marriage Fight, ATLANTIC (Oct.
29, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/gaming-out-the-end-of-the-gaymarriage-fight/382103 [http://perma.cc/8VQ6-GXN9 (“[A]bout two-thirds of states now have
gay marriage, and about two-thirds of American citizens live in those states.”).
205. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 196 (1986).
206. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 73.
207. See Berger, supra note 197, at 817; Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 436-37 (2005).
208. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
209. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Homosexual Rights; Justices, 6-3, Legalize
Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal of Court’s ‘86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003,
at A1.
210. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 575).
211. See Guinier, supra note 30, at 76 (discussing the widespread media coverage of Heller).
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addition to depicting the evidence in a one-sided fashion,212 he
emphasized that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home.”213 Such invocations of “hearth
and home” get to the heart of the gun lobby’s sacred mission to
empower individuals to protect themselves and their families
against violent intruders.214 This kind of language may also
indirectly help galvanize political officials, such as state legislators,
to see all gun regulations as illegitimate.215
Justice Scalia further appealed to gun-rights advocates by
reminding his audience that “the enshrinement of constitutional
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table....
Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment is outmoded
.... [B]ut what is not debatable is that it is not the role of this Court
to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.”216 This language is
powerful, but also legally gratuitous.217 All lawyers and judges know
that legislators may not pass laws conflicting with the Constitution.
No informed observer thought that the District of Columbia was
arguing that it should be permitted to violate the “outmoded”
Second Amendment. Rather, the case asked difficult questions
about the Second Amendment’s meaning and application. To this
extent, Justice Scalia offers a celebratory nod to pro-gun advocates,
who have long insisted that gun regulations violate their constitutional rights. Indeed, this language may have encouraged some of
those advocates to lose sight of that case’s limited holding.218
212. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
213. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
214. See Reva B. Siegel, Comment, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 239 (2008) (“When Justice Scalia explains
that the Second Amendment protects rights of the ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home,’ he echoes ... [those] who all claim the Second
Amendment protects rights of the ‘law-abiding’ and invoke the distinction between citizens
and criminals to explain the Second Amendment.”).
215. See, e.g., Bills Would Reject Federal Restrictions on Firearms, UNICAMERAL UPDATE
(Mar. 21, 2013), http://update.legislature.ne.gov/?p=10989 [http://perma.cc/6KP2-2VD6]
(reporting on proposed bill in the Nebraska Legislature that would deem federal gun
regulations unenforceable in Nebraska).
216. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
217. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending
that the majority opinion “will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed”).
218. See infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text.
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2. Absolutism as Persuasion of Colleagues
In addition to persuading the public, the Justices naturally hope
to persuade each other. Presumably, this is true in any case, but
especially so in cases in which a changed vote would alter the outcome. Many scholars have noted that Justices communicate with
each other primarily in conference and through their written
opinions and questions at oral argument.219 Given these limited
opportunities for interaction, the Justices may draft opinions to try
to win votes for their position.
However, while this explanation may sometimes apply, it often
does not. For one, the Justices often do not change their vote after
the initial conference,220 so from a strategic point of view, it would
be strange if they crafted their opinions primarily to prompt an
unlikely switch. Probably more importantly, a Justice trying to
persuade a colleague might prefer more moderate, concessionary
rhetoric to emphasize the modesty of the majority opinion. Of
course, the relative persuasiveness of a given opinion depends on
the issue and the Justices involved, but swing Justices are often
undecided because they recognize the strength of the arguments on
each side. To this extent, a more measured tone may often be a more
effective way to persuade the Justice who considers a case genuinely difficult. Indeed, research indicates that overstatement is rarely
persuasive,221 and Justices authoring opinions in close cases, perhaps intuiting this conclusion, sometimes compromise their
reasoning to try to garner a majority.222
From this perspective, absolutist rhetoric may be a sounder
strategy in dissents, where a Justice can present her own views
without worrying about holding together a fragile coalition of
219. E.g., Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Functions of Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 62 Q. J. SPEECH 410, 418-19 (1976).
220. See Friedman, supra note 185, at 286. But see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9 (1998) (stating that Justices switch their votes, make changes in
opinions, or join writings that do not necessarily reflect their sincere preferences in more than
half of argued cases).
221. See Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 429.
222. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 220, at 9-11. Some Justices may also write opinions to try to appease the losing side with moderating language. See, e.g., United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013) (emphasizing states’ rights in a decision striking down
the federal Defense of Marriage Act); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419
(2013) (indicating that affirmative action is not categorically unconstitutional).
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colleagues.223 Indeed, the dissenter’s absolutism, though more
counterintuitive, may be less misleading in that the dissenter is
obviously not speaking for the Court. The dissent’s absolutism, then,
will never be confused with the law today, but it aspires to change
the law tomorrow.
Thus, even if absolutist language only infrequently changes the
minds of current swing Justices, it can influence future Justices,
thereby appealing, as Chief Justice Hughes put it, to the “intelligence of a future day.”224 This influence can be relatively direct, such
as when a lawyer or law student latches onto language she finds
particularly persuasive and subsequently ascends to the Supreme
Court. It can also occur less directly, such as when the language
gets adopted by popular movements and ultimately helps shape the
discourse surrounding a particular legal issue.225 In all events,
Justices realize that tomorrow’s Court may revisit today’s judgment,
and they may choose language hoping to persuade those future
Justices.
3. Absolutism as Rule of Law
The Justices may also sometimes use rhetorical absolutism to
enhance the rule of law by imbuing their opinions with a sense of
inevitability.226 Even in cases with strong arguments on each side,
Justices may fear that equivocal reasoning would expose “the
terrifying arbitrariness that underlies much of the legal system.”227
By insisting in absolutist terms that the Constitution unequivocally
demands a particular outcome, a Justice presents the law as clear
and objective.
Absolutist rhetoric thus implies that the Justices’ own policy
preferences have nothing to do with their decisions.228 It, therefore,
helps justify an unelected judiciary’s exercise of power over the
223. See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 42 (noting the
pleasure of writing an opinion for oneself that addresses “precisely the degree of quibble, or
foreboding, or disbelief, or indignation” that one thinks is justified).
224. CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
225. Cf. infra notes 397-400 and accompanying text.
226. See Robert Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
201, 206-07 (1990).
227. Levinson, supra note 5, at 189.
228. See Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at 2010.
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political branches because that exercise of power merely reflects
enforcement of the land’s highest law. In this way, absolutist
rhetoric can sometimes mollify Justices’ anxiety about the Court’s
countermajoritarian function.229 Similarly, the Court, as in Graham,
may use absolutist rhetoric to assert the existence of a national consensus, thus ostensibly mitigating the countermajoritarian problem
that arises when it invalidates a democratically enacted statute.230
Whether these rhetorical strategies effectively reinforce judicial
legitimacy is, of course, another question, but some Justices may
think that they do, or, at least, may feel like they need to pretend
that they do.
Justices similarly may rest constitutional judgments on absolutist
factual statements, thereby suggesting that their legal views hinge
on empirical facts, not normative values.231 In Shelby County, for
instance, the Court rested its holding on the “fact” that race-based
voter discrimination was largely a thing of the past.232 Of course, the
four dissenters viewed those facts very differently, but the majority
may have thought that its reliance on “facts” insulated it from criticisms that it was unfairly biased against the Voting Rights Act or
minority voters.
Justices may also think that strongly worded opinions can
reinforce the rule of law by providing better guidance to lower
courts, litigants, and other governmental actors, all of whom must
follow Supreme Court precedent. This explanation is ultimately
unconvincing, because it confuses the clarity of a holding with the
rhetoric justifying that holding. A holding may be emphatically
defended but imprecisely stated. Alternatively, a court may concede
that a case is close while still issuing a clear, easily applied holding.
Nevertheless, some Justices, cognizant that lower courts must
follow their ruling, may confuse the two. Moreover, even if they do
not, Justices may believe that lower courts may be reluctant to
extend an equivocal opinion to similar cases if they fear that the
Court itself does not fully believe in its decision.233
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See BICKEL, supra note 31, at 16-17.
See supra Part I.B.4.
See Kahan, supra note 4, at 35.
See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
Cf. Mark Tushnet, Introduction to I DISSENT: GREAT OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK
SUPREME COURT CASES, at xiii (Mark Tushnet ed., 2008).
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4. Absolutism as Formalism
Absolutism can also be part of a related rhetorical strategy to
present the law generally as orderly, rule-based, and objective,
thereby further enhancing the rule of law.234 Under this approach,
absolutism not only tries to convey the inevitability of a particular
decision but also facilitates a broader project to imbue the law with
clear rules, thereby decreasing judicial discretion and appealing to
the autonomy of constitutional law to justify the Court’s constraint
of the political branches.235 This presumption of clear answers
implies that legal interpretation is formalistic—that is, that the law,
including the Constitution, provides observable rules unconnected
to a judge’s own value system.236
Justice Scalia is probably the Justice whose absolutist rhetoric
most often reflects such formalism. Justice Scalia often views the
law formalistically, seeing obvious answers where others see
ambiguities.237 He prefers rules to standards, because rules provide
stricter guidance to future courts.238 Standards, by contrast, are
more malleable and thus increase judicial discretion.239
To this extent, some absolutist rhetoric may reflect not merely a
rhetorical flourish to support a particular outcome but instead a
more fundamental insistence that constitutional interpretation
234. Cf. MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 4 (2013).
235. See Post, supra note 30, at 11.
236. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis,
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 169-70
(2006).
237. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 114-15 (1992) (“Scalia is ... optimistic
about the possibility that judges can rationalize the chaotic jumble of twentieth-century
constitutional precedents and reorder constitutional law around clear interpretive and
operative rules.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J.
529, 530 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)) (“Justice Scalia is the clearest and most selfconscious expositor of democratic formalism in the long history of American law.”).
238. See Sullivan, supra note 237, at 58-59, 65.
239. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for entertaining a “grab bag” of factors); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[A] rule of law that binds neither by
text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.”); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175-76 (1989); Sullivan, supra note
237, at 57-59.

2015]

THE RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL ABSOLUTISM

707

ought to proceed with clear rules.240 For Justice Scalia, the law has
and should have a rigorous and rigid structure.241 This intellectual
edifice is an impressive construct, but it is also inflexible insofar as
it cannot conceive of provisions meaning something different from
(Justice Scalia’s idea of) the provision’s original conception. This is
a vision of law that has difficulty admitting doubt because the entire
structure rests upon an intricate architecture. Consequently, contrary evidence must be contradicted or explained away so as not to
undermine the structure’s foundation.
By contrast, other Justices with a more pragmatic outlook are
probably less likely to embrace absolutism because they tend to see
law less objectively. A pragmatist like Justice Breyer, for instance,
is more likely to acknowledge constitutional indeterminacy.242 For
example, in his dissent in Printz v. United States, Justice Breyer
noted that “the Constitution itself is silent on the matter” of federal
assignment of responsibilities to state officials, thus removing the
need or reason “to find in the Constitution an absolute principle.”243
Whereas the absolutist insists on unyielding principles to resolve
cases, the pragmatist more willingly accepts that constitutional
questions can be difficult, ambiguous, and context-laden.
In constitutional interpretation, formalists sometimes gravitate
towards originalism.244 Though there are several variants of origin-

240. Of course, one might view formalism as itself part of the judicial opinion’s rhetorical
performance, in which case, it, like absolutism, is merely another rhetorical tool. See
Ferguson, supra note 226, at 208.
241. A former student of Justice Scalia’s recounted that then-Professor Scalia opened his
Contracts class by saying, “Contracts law is like a puzzle. Each class you will get another
piece, and at the end of the course, they will fit together to make a beautiful picture.” See Email from Lynn Branham, Visiting Professor, St. Louis Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Jan. 16,
2014, 12:51 CST) (on file with author).
242. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Indecency; High Court Splits on
Indecency Law Covering Cable TV, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29, 1996, at A1 (describing Justice
Breyer’s free speech opinion in Denver Area Consortium v. FCC as “tentative, almost
apologetic”).
243. 521 U.S. 898, 978 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244. See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183,
186-88 (2005) (noting that originalism does not always lead to formalism but does in the
jurisprudence of Justice Scalia); Michael S. Greve, The Originalism That Was, and the One
That Will Be, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 101, 108 (2013) (“[O]riginalism was self-consciously and
deliberately formulated as a ... democratic formalism.”).
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alism,245 many originalists believe that the Constitution’s meaning
should be determined by identifying “meanings that are conventional given relevant linguistic practices” at the time of
ratification.246 Those meanings are “facts determined by the evidence,”247 and, consequently, can be presented in an ostensibly
objective light. Judge Bork’s view that “[a]ll that counts is how the
words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the
time” reflects the formalist’s optimism that a clear, objective
meaning can be located.248
Interestingly, the originalist’s interpretation of the evidence not
only determines the outcome of a given case but also purports to
lock in a constitutional provision’s meaning forever. By confidently
asserting a provision’s original meaning, absolutist rhetoric camouflages the boldness of relying on contestable or obscure historical
facts to forever set constitutional meaning.249 Absolutist rhetoric,
then, can be a strategy that both asserts a particular provision’s
original meaning and reminds future courts that that original
meaning, once identified, ought not be disrupted.
Predictably, the divide between formalists and originalists, on the
one hand, and pragmatists and living constitutionalists, on the
other, sometimes reflects political differences. Though there are obviously important exceptions, conservatives are more likely than
liberals to gravitate towards originalism and formalism.250 Perhaps
this interpretive preference is outcome-driven: conservatives favor
originalism because they think it is more likely to yield outcomes
they like, and liberals oppose it for the same reason.251 But differing
attitudes towards originalism may also reflect disagreement about
the notion of legal objectivity. Whereas liberals tend to see the Constitution and other legal texts as underdeterminate, conservatives
245. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239,
244 (2009).
246. Solum, supra note 8, at 35.
247. Id. at 36.
248. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
144 (1990).
249. See Berger, supra note 79, at 347-56, 358-60 (arguing that in many instances, the
historical and linguistic evidence is too complicated to allow the judge to identify a single
original meaning).
250. See Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 374 (2011).
251. See id. at 360 (“It should come as little surprise that originalists share the
characteristics traditionally associated with political conservatives.”).
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are more likely to identify objective definitions that fix constitutional meaning.252 On this account, absolutism helps safeguard a
formalist conception of the rule of law, because it insists on objective
meanings (originalist or otherwise), thereby ostensibly preventing
judges from fashioning legal rules out of their own normative
commitments.253
B. Institutional Explanations
1. The Politics of the Judicial System
Another set of explanations for the Justices’ absolutist rhetoric is
institutional, rooted in various political and judicial structures and
practices. To begin, the country’s broader political landscape helps
shape the judiciary. Though judges are removed from everyday
politics, in some senses, politics does shape their behavior.254 Perhaps most importantly, ideological considerations play a prominent
role in judicial appointments, especially at the Supreme Court
level.255 Though the Justices are subsequently insulated from direct
political pressure insofar as they enjoy salary protection and life
tenure,256 the politicized nature of the judicial appointments process
determines who ascends to the Court.257 In recent years, the
252. Of course, liberals also can utilize the rhetoric of constitutional absolutism. For
example, some of Justice Ginsburg’s dissents ring with the certainty of a majority opinion. See
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636-37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgement, and dissenting in part).
253. See Greene et al., supra note 250, at 387.
254. See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Several Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial
Politics Studies: Why “Ideological Influence” Is Not Partisanship, 61 EMORY L.J. 759, 774
(2012) (discussing how judges are informed by their political orientation when the law points
to several correct answers).
255. Id. at 772.
256. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
257. See, e.g., Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court
Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069,
1071 (1999) (“Given the Court’s key role in setting public policy, the president will want a
Court that shares his ideology and thus will nominate someone who will bring the Court
closer to his preferences.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics
in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 40-44 (2006),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/questioning-justice-law-and-politics-in-judicialconfirmation-hearings [http://perma.cc/ZA7K-V4EE] (discussing the political nature of judicial
confirmation hearings).
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confirmation process has become especially partisan.258 Whereas
some mid-twentieth-century Justices, like Chief Justice Stone and
Justices Brennan and Powell, were nominated by a President of an
opposing party,259 it is almost unthinkable that a President today
would knowingly select a Justice with a different party affiliation.
To some extent, this shift is because the two major political parties
are far more ideologically distinct than they were in the midtwentieth century,260 but it is also because ideology today plays a
much more prominent role in the appointments process.261
In all events, presidents try to select confirmable Justices who
reflect their own values. Although some Justices end up disappointing the President who appointed them, most Justices are carefully
vetted and share ideologies that are consistent with many of the
appointing President’s general views. Through written opinions,
these Justices can articulate and sometimes entrench the view of
the law that helped get them their job in the first place. Justices, of
course, can also express their views in other ways, such as speeches
at well-publicized events organized by groups like the Federalist
Society and American Constitution Society. Judicial opinions,
however, remain the best way for Justices to make their mark on
the law and society.
2. The Court’s Internal Culture
The Court’s own institutional practices also help explain absolutist rhetoric. Although majority opinions speak for the Court, the
Court’s internal operations reflect and encourage each Justice to
speak for herself. Justice Powell once described the Court as nine
small independent law firms, which collectively create a competitive, entrepreneurial culture.262 Justices apparently rarely discuss
cases in person with each other outside conference.263 They also
rarely collaborate on the written product. Of course, Justices
258. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 116-17.
259. See Karlan, supra note 65, at 66.
260. E.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS,
POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at ix (2010).
261. E.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 117.
262. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., What the Justices Are Saying, 62 A.B.A. J. 1454, 1454 (1976).
263. See James F. Spriggs II et al., Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices’
Responses to Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 486 (1999).
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frequently suggest that an authoring colleague change his reasoning.264 However, unlike, say, lawyers collectively drafting a brief, it
is commonly understood that the Justices’ suggestions are intended
not to improve the quality of the team’s final product but rather to
refine a legal point so that it is substantively palatable enough to
join.265 An opinion for the Court speaks for the institution, but it
usually is authored by a single Justice, not a committee of the
majority.
Equally importantly, unlike some other legal systems, the U.S.
legal system permits disagreement among judges. By contrast, some
European countries make it a crime for a judge to publish a dissent
or even make known that she disagreed with the majority
decision.266 The justices on the South African Constitutional Court
take a middle ground approach, allowing dissents but meeting
numerous times to try to find common ground when disagreement
persists.267 Because the U.S. Supreme Court permits and tacitly
encourages separate opinions, the Court acknowledges that
disagreements about the law’s content are a natural part of the
business of American judging.
The irony is that by permitting internal disagreements, the Court
fosters a sense of independence, which encourages each Justice to
insist that his view of the law is uniquely correct. This sense of
independence is especially powerful in contemporary times. While
Chief Justice Marshall persuaded his colleagues that the Court
should abandon its practice of seriatim opinions and speak with a
single voice,268 Justices started to dissent at increased rates,

264. Id. at 485-86 (“This institutional rule therefore provides incentives for Justices to
bargain with the majority opinion author and for the author to sometimes accommodate their
concerns.”).
265. See Chris W. Bonneau et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority
Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 890, 892 (2007) (describing how
Justices making suggestions to an opinion draft do not do so to create an “ideal” opinion but
rather to suggest changes to legal points).
266. See TUSHNET, supra note 233, at xiii.
267. See MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
UNITED STATES 47 (2009) (citing Justice Goldstone).
268. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 220, at 118.
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starting in the 1930s and accelerating in the 1950s.269 This trend
continues still today.270
The increase of separate opinions has helped the absolutist tone
flourish, even as their very existence belies the notion that those
cases have obvious answers. This rise of separate opinions perpetuates each Justice’s sense of independence and willingness to express
individual views more often and forcefully, sometimes with a
recognizable writing style, which, intentionally or not, may be prone
to absolutism. Justice Scalia’s opinions, for instance, sometimes
sarcastically brush off opposing views, refusing to engage seriously
and respectfully with their strongest arguments.271 Justice Kennedy
sometimes adopts a grandiose style that celebrates his preferred
constitutional values at a broad level of generality so as to make a
case seem easier than it really is.272
The rise of judicial independence also likely discourages Justices
authoring majority opinions from fully exploring counterarguments.
Separate opinions are so common that Justices may sometimes omit
discussion of contrary arguments, because they believe another
Justice will or should make her own case herself. Obviously,
Justices sometimes must moderate their views to hold together a
269. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme
Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1988); see also EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 220, at
24.
270. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 220, at 24.
271. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the majority opinion “has no foundation in American constitutional law, and barely
pretends to”); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (denigrating the majority opinion as
preserving “a chaos that is evident to anyone who can read and count”); Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 399 (2000)
(“No Justice in Supreme Court history has consistently written with the sarcasm of Justice
Scalia.”); Hasen, supra note 52, at 1.
272. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014) (“Ceremonial prayer is
but a recognition that, since this Nation was founded and until the present day, many
Americans deem that their own existence must be understood by precepts far beyond the
authority of government to alter or define.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”); Erin Daly, The New Liberty, 11
WIDENER L. REV. 221, 246 (2005) (describing Justice Kennedy’s style as “grandiose”); Edward
Lazarus, Kennedy Center: The Court’s New Swing Vote, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 2005, at 16
(“Kennedy’s opinions often feature grand statements of principle.”). But see Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 752 (2008) (Kennedy, J.) (noting “reasons to doubt” that the “historical
record ... yields a definite answer to the questions before us”).
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majority coalition,273 but their collective sense of independence helps
perpetuate rhetorical absolutism.
In addition to fostering judicial independence, this culture may
also result in a collective action problem. Even a Justice disinclined
to write an absolutist opinion might fear that an equivocal opinion
would look weak in comparison to an absolutist opinion on the other
side. Indeed, there likely is something to this concern. Readers
sensing that one side is more confident than the other may tend to
assume that the more confident side must be correct. Justices, then,
may sometimes write absolutist opinions because they fear that the
other side will.
Relatedly, because it is generally understood that opinions reflect
a particular chamber’s work product, some Justices may be willing
to sign onto opinions, including absolutist opinions, even if they
would not have written the opinion the same way themselves. A
Justice, of course, will not join an opinion with which she fundamentally disagrees, but she may sign one if she agrees with the general
reasoning, even if she would not have phrased her arguments as
strenuously. As Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, many people
who lack firm convictions end up believing what other relevant
people believe, and judges are not immune to these cascade effects.274 A judge inclined to agree with certain colleagues as a
general matter on particular issues, then, may become convinced
that an absolutist opinion is correct enough to join. The judge who
feels especially strongly about an issue, by contrast, may be more
likely to draft a separate absolutist opinion than join a more
moderate one.
Absolutist rhetoric has long been a feature of some Supreme
Court constitutional opinions,275 but it is worth noting that some
commentators have noticed a rise in disrespectful Supreme Court
rhetoric in recent years.276 If this perception is correct, the more
273. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Arguments in Constitutional Law, 74
SOC. RES. 1, 2 (2007).
274. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71, 83 (2000); see also Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to
Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158,
167-82 (1999).
275. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (suggesting that
the question of Congress’s power to create a national bank was constitutionally easy).
276. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 92; Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at
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politicized appointments process and the rise of separate opinions
may help explain the change. The Court’s shrinking docket may also
play a role, as it gives the Justices more time to hone “rhetorical
flourishes.”277 Justices today may also be relying on law clerks more
heavily.278 Although extremely talented, clerks’ legal experiences are
usually limited, and they may compensate by drafting opinions to
sound confident.279 Collectively, then, these shifts in the Court’s
institutional culture may help explain the apparent rise of absolutist rhetoric.
3. Dispute Resolution and the Institutional Role of Lawyers’
Arguments
A final institutional explanation behind absolutist rhetoric is that
lawyers’ briefs and oral arguments frame cases for the Court, and
the Justices, like all judges, may rely on the lawyers’ arguments to
shape their own opinions. On this account, the Court’s primary
institutional role is to resolve disputes between the parties before
it,280 and the parties’ framing of these issues necessarily shapes the
resolution of those disputes. Lawyers, of course, sometimes frame
their arguments in absolutist terms to maximize their briefs’
persuasive power,281 so it is inevitable that judges picking sides
would sometimes latch onto the absolutist arguments that persuaded them in a particular case.282
2021 (noting that the Justices in recent years seem “far more willing to use a ‘poison pen’”).
277. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 120.
278. See Todd C. Peppers, Of Leakers and Legal Briefers: The Modern Supreme Court Law
Clerk, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 95, 107 (2012).
279. See Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the
Supreme Court, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2011).
280. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668 (2012) (discussing “the dispute resolution model and the
law declaration model” as two adjudicatory models competing for the Court’s affection).
281. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal
Courts—One Judge’s Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3, 6 (2013) (“The lawyer’s task was to try to
persuade the judge that, properly interpreted, the authoritative materials yielded the answer
to the legal question posed by the case that favored the lawyer’s client.”); Irving Younger,
Symptoms of Bad Writing, 72 A.B.A. J. 113 (1986) (identifying the “solemn overstatement that
many lawyers seem to think is the way to argue a case”).
282. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 21-22 (2007) (noting that
judges “sometimes insert into their opinions, without attribution, verbatim passages from
lawyers’ briefs”); Moses Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions From Below the Bench, 49
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To give just one example, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller
tracked the respondent’s brief ’s absolutist arguments on some
important points in that case. Respondent contended with great
certainly that “the Second Amendment’s preamble cannot limit,
transform, or negate its operative rights-securing text.”283 The
majority opinion concluded identically, writing, “apart from that
clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the
scope of the operative clause.”284 Similarly, just as the respondent’s
brief concluded that the historical evidence definitively proved that
the phrase “keep and bear arms” did not have an “exclusively military connotation,”285 so too did the majority opinion announce an
identical conclusion.286 Of course, there is nothing wrong with a
judicial opinion coming to the same conclusion as a legal brief, and
Justice Scalia certainly had strong evidence on his side for these
propositions. It is also understandable that the respondent’s brief
did not identify contrary evidence; that was the petitioner’s job.
What is striking, however, is that the Court, like the respondent,
also depicted the evidence as entirely one-sided, even though, as the
dissent demonstrated, there was important contrary evidence.287
Of course, lawyers’ arguments only explain so much. Though the
Court often does accept the parties’ framing of a dispute, it also
often injects its own interests into a case, shaping the contours of a
decision as it sees fit. Indeed, with increased frequency, the Court
has asserted its prerogative to set its own agenda, regardless of the
litigants’ wishes.288 Moreover, with the rise of the Internet, the
Court often performs its own in-house research, thus further freeing
it from lower court factual findings and the parties’ own
assertions.289 To be sure, the lawyers’ briefs still matter a great deal,
CALIF. L. REV. 831, 831-32 (1961) (noting that some judges’ opinions consist “of reassembled
segments clipped from the prevailing briefs”).
283. Respondent’s Brief at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07290), 2008 WL 336304.
284. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
285. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 283, at 33-37 (surveying evidence to conclude that
the phrase “bear arms” was not limited to the military but included self-defense and killing
game).
286. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581-92.
287. See id., 554 U.S. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288. Monaghan, supra note 280, at 669.
289. See Larsen, supra note 161, at 1271-77 (arguing that Supreme Court “in-house”
factual finding is prevalent).
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but given that the Court sometimes reframes a case itself,290 its use
of absolutist rhetoric cannot be fairly traced just to the arguments
of the lawyers before it.
C. Psychological Explanations
Psychological explanations also shed light on the Justices’ choice of
language less as strategic judgments, and more as a manifestation
of less conscious phenomena to which most people, including judges,
are subject. Like the explanations more generally, these psychological phenomena can be interrelated but, for ease of presentation, I
discuss them separately.
1. Confirmation Bias and Cultural Cognition
Like other people, the Justices are subject to the “unconscious
tendency of individuals to process information in a manner that
suits some end or goal extrinsic to the formation of accurate
beliefs.”291 Professor Dan Kahan has explored this phenomenon of
motivated reasoning with particular attention to cultural cognition,
which “refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their
perceptions of ... policy-consequential facts to their cultural worldviews.”292 Professor Kahan argues persuasively that individuals are
likely to seek out information that supports positions they normatively favor.293 They similarly seek out information bolstering
viewpoints associated with groups with which they identify.294 Many
290. In Citizens United v. FEC, for instance, the Court declined invitations to decide the
case on narrower grounds and instead went out of its way to issue a broad First Amendment
holding. 550 U.S. 310, 322-29 (2010) (arguing that the case should not be resolved on the
narrow grounds presented by the parties); Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 489 (noting that Citizens United “eschewed
the [available] narrow grounds of decision … even those suggested by Citizens United itself,
and actually ordered the parties to file briefs on the much broader and more controversial
question of whether Austin and McConnell should be overruled”); cf. Monaghan, supra note
280, at 668-69 (noting that the Court recently has “in significant measure” embraced a “law
declaration model” of adjudication rather than a “dispute-resolution model”).
291. Kahan, supra note 4, at 19.
292. Id. at 23.
293. See id. at 20.
294. See Matthew J. Hornsey, Linking Superiority Bias in the Interpersonal and Intergroup
Domains, 143 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 479, 488 (2003) (arguing that social identity theorists claim

2015]

THE RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL ABSOLUTISM

717

people are then likely to credit or dismiss evidence selectively based
on congeniality to personal and group identity.295
Psychological research into this phenomenon further suggests
that confirmation bias shapes people’s evaluation of evidence, so
that it bolsters preexisting normative preferences, beliefs, and expectations.296 Rather than concede that evidence is complicated and
contradictory, people seek cognitive coherence.297 They therefore try
to avoid “persistent uncertainty” and often “adjust their assessments
of more equivocal pieces of evidence to match their assessment of
more compelling ones.”298 As Francis Bacon noted centuries ago,
“The human understanding, when any proposition has been once
laid down ... forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation.”299 Thus, people unconsciously adjust their assessment of
equivocal pieces of evidence to match their preexisting worldview
and therefore tend to think that answers come easily, because the
evidence all points in one direction.300
Although judges sometimes do better than lay people at resisting
certain cognitive biases, research suggests that they are not immune from them.301 Indeed, Justices deciding constitutional cases
that the value that people attach to their group memberships has direct implications for their
self-concept); Mark Schaller, Social Categorization and the Formation of Group Stereotypes
Further Evidence for Biased Information Processing in the Perception of Group-Behavior
Correlations, 21 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 25-26 (1991).
295. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 20; Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the
Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629 (2000) (“Perhaps the
Justices of the Supreme Court, like the rest of us, care about their reputation, care about the
esteem in which they are held by certain reference groups, and care enough such that, at the
margin or even far from the margin, they seek to conform their behavior to the demands of
the relevant esteem-granting (or withholding) or reputation-creating (or damaging) groups.”).
296. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
297. See Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 421-23.
298. Kahan, supra note 4, at 60; see Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive
Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 512-13 (2004).
299. FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM 23 (Joseph Devey ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1902)
(1620).
300. See Nickerson, supra note 296, at 175 (“[C]onfirmation bias connotes a less explicit,
less consciously one-sided case-building process.”).
301. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging:
What Difference Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 419 (2009); Paul M. Secunda, Cultural
Cognition Insights into Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits Cases, 3 AM. U. LAB.
& EMP. L. F. 1, 8 (2013).
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face professional pressures that may make them especially prone to
motivated reasoning. Evidence of constitutional meaning can be
complicated and conflicting, but, unlike scholars, Justices do not
have the luxury of emphasizing these tensions.302 They instead must
decide cases and justify their decisions.
Moreover, because constitutional cases can present numerous
kinds of arguments pointing in different directions, Justices may
sometimes be prone to relying on intuition rather than judgment to
simplify their decision-making process. Intuitive judgments
typically are “automatic, heuristic-based, and relatively undemanding of computational capacity.”303 Intuition can be surprisingly
accurate,304 but sometimes good judgment requires the decision
maker to override that intuition with more deductive, deliberate
decision making. Judges, however, do not always rigorously check
the correctness of their intuitions, and, even if they do, that
deliberation is often colored by the initial intuition.305 Indeed, as
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have argued, because judges
have confidence in their preexisting views and intuitions, they also
are likely to overestimate the consistency of data supporting those
views and to derive too much confidence from them.306 Like other
people, then, judges may be prone to process information to support
their preferred outcome.307
Cultural cognition biases, thus, help shape Justices’ approaches
to constitutional decision making. As we have already seen, whereas
Justice Scalia interpreted the historical evidence in Heller in favor
of an individual right to bear arms unconnected to militia service,
Justice Stevens read the evidence to support an opposite
conclusion.308 As other commentators have noted, it is probably no
302. See Berger, supra note 79, at 366-67.
303. See Guthrie et al., supra note 301, at 7 (distinguishing “intuition” and “deduction”);
Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for
the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
421, 436-38 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
304. See Guthrie et al., supra note 301, at 30 (“Intuitive judgments are often quite
accurate.”).
305. See id. at 8-9.
306. DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, INTUITIVE PREDICTION: BIASES AND CORRECTIVE
PROCEDURES 4-5 (1977).
307. See generally Elliott Aronson, The Power of Self-Persuasion, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
875, 876 (1999).
308. See supra Part I.B.1.
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coincidence that in a case with difficult, conflicting evidence, the
Justices usually considered conservative voted in favor of gun
rights, whereas the Justices usually considered liberal voted against
them.309 As Justice Holmes once put it, “One has to remember that
when one’s interest is keenly excited evidence gathers from all sides
around the magnetic point.”310
These cognitive biases apply not just to the factors that shape
legal determinations—for example, the meaning of the Second
Amendment—but also the factual landscape to which law is
applied—for example, the existence of voting practices discriminating against racial minorities. As Kahan points out, Justices
sometimes resort to supposedly empirical fact-finding for strategic
reasons to pretend that the facts, rather than norms, guide decisionmaking.311 In Shelby County, for instance, the majority based its
decision on the deeply contested factual conclusion that race-based
voter discrimination has been mostly eradicated.312 Although this
effort to root contentious decisions in facts rather than norms may
partially reflect an effort to avoid denigrating the losing group’s
constitutional vision,313 it can also hide the extent to which norms
shape the Justices’ factual conclusions.
Cultural cognition, thus, helps explain absolutist rhetoric, because it helps show how Justices, mostly unwittingly, might sort
through conflicting evidence to confirm rather than complicate their
preexisting worldviews.314 Having sorted through the evidence in
this way, a Justice then may believe that a case is easy. On this
account, absolutism reflects not so much a rhetorical strategy as a
309. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Putting the Gun Control Debate in Social Perspective, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 480 (2004) (discussing the Court’s ideological divide and the Second
Amendment); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637,
641-42 (1989) (noting that conservatives and liberals understand the Second Amendment very
differently); Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 79, 79
(2010) (“Supreme Court Justices frequently divide on questions of original meaning, and the
divisions have a way of mapping what we might suspect are the Justices’ leanings about the
merits of cases irrespective of originalist considerations.”).
310. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Holmes).
311. Kahan, supra note 4, at 35.
312. See supra Part I.B.5.
313. Kahan, supra note 4, at 35.
314. See Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 423 (arguing that most decision makers are
unaware of their propensity for coherence-based reasoning).
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Justice’s “hermeneutical circle” in which she interprets new
evidence in accordance with her own intuitive sense of the world,
which is simultaneously reinforced by her interpretation of the new
evidence.315 Justices, then, may discuss constitutional cases as
though they are easy because they consider the evidence in a
manner that makes cases seem easier than they really are.
2. Self-Certainty and Overconfidence
Another psychological explanation for absolutist rhetoric is that
the Justices simply believe they are correct and use opinions to
express candidly their views of the law. Given the Justices’ exceptional pedigrees and deep experience in interpreting and applying
legal texts, it is no wonder they would have confidence in their
conclusions. Absolutist rhetoric, then, may reflect a Justice’s selfconfidence and her related frustration that her colleagues were not
clear-headed enough to see the right answer.
This judicial self-certainty might be understood as a kind of
overconfidence bias.316 Psychological research in judgment and
decision making shows that many people display a tendency for
overconfidence,317 overestimating the correctness of their estimates
in answering moderate to difficult questions.318 Similarly, many
people are prone to a superiority bias, overestimating their abilities
relative to others.319

315. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 351-52 (1990) (explaining the “hermeneutical circle” idea
that no interpretive thread can be viewed in isolation so that each interpretive thread will be
evaluated in relation to other threads).
316. Conversely, this self-certainty may also compensate for insecurity. While the Justices
are certainly all very talented, they are usually generalists who must announce binding
judgments about issues with which they lack expertise. In this way, absolutist rhetoric,
somewhat paradoxically, may reflect both judicial overconfidence and insecurity.
317. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 23, at 137.
318. See Daniel P. Forbes, Are Some Entrepreneurs More Overconfident than Others?, 20
J. BUS. VENTURING 623, 624 (2005) (describing the overconfidence bias).
319. See Mark D. Alicke, Global Self-Evaluation as Determined by the Desirability and
Controllability of Trait Adjectives, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1621, 1624, 1626
(1985) (presenting research findings that study participants perceived themselves to be
characterized by more desireable character traits than the average person); Hornsey, supra
note 294, at 479.
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Judges are hardly immune to these heuristic biases.320 Psychological research has demonstrated that lawyers, as a class, are
especially prone to overconfidence biases,321 often predicting with
great certainty the likely outcome of litigation only to have future
events prove them incorrect.322 This penchant for overconfidence
may be related to the fact that lawyers have a keener interest in
and greater control over the outcome of their predictions than do
other professionals, such as, for instance, meterologists.323
While Supreme Court Justices’ work obviously differs from that
of other lawyers, the Justices’ long experiences as lawyers may
make them prone to the same kind of overconfidence. Indeed,
having reached the pinnacle of their profession, each Justice has
especially good reason to consider himself a superior lawyer, thereby
further boosting his confidence. Moreover, while lawyers enjoy some
control over the outcomes of their cases, Supreme Court Justices
often enjoy far more; by persuading a handful of colleagues, they can
shape outcomes to coincide with their views and thereby bind the
rest of the country. Additionally, male lawyers are particularly
susceptible to overconfidence.324 Two-thirds of the current Justices
are male (and, of course, the vast majority of Justices through our
history have also been men), so it is possible that the Court’s
historical gender demographics have bent the institution towards
overconfidence.325
This point should not be overstated. Good lawyers are probably
less prone to overconfidence than average or bad lawyers. Good
lawyers, after all, more accurately predict the outcome of litigation
than other lawyers;326 that ability to predict outcomes accurately
helps explain their professional success.327 Most Supreme Court
320. See Guthrie et al., supra note 301, at 28.
321. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 23, at 153.
322. See id.
323. Id. at 150.
324. Id. at 149.
325. Assuming that the psychological research is accurate and that the Court’s gender
balance eventually evens out, one wonders whether we might notice changed rhetoric over
time.
326. By contrast, accurate predictions seem less important to the success of a law professor.
A substantial portion of the academic role, after all, is to offer insightful critiques about the
Court’s decisions rather than to counsel clients on how the Court is likely to act.
327. See KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY, supra note 306, at 20 (“It appears that overconfidence does
not occur when the expert has considerable information about the conditional distribution of
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Justices, of course, were once excellent lawyers. From this perspective, the Justices should be less susceptible to this cognitive bias
than other lawyers.
Nevertheless, Justices may transfer their deserved confidence in
their professional abilities into a false confidence that they can
determine “correct” constitutional outcomes more accurately than
their colleagues.328 Predicting the outcome of a case before a
particular court is not the same thing as announcing the answer to
a constitutional problem. The former can be empirically tested; the
latter cannot be. A future Court may someday revisit even a
unanimous Supreme Court constitutional decision. Indeed, the very
fact that some Justices think there is an objectively “correct” answer
is, to some extent, symptomatic of overconfidence, because it
pretends that there is an objective answer to an inquiry with many
components, some normative. Moreover, though the Justices’ past
success may give them confidence in their own legal judgments, that
confidence may desensitize them to the talents of their colleagues,
who are similarly accomplished. Although a Justice’s sense of
superiority over the average lawyer is usually deserved, his sense
of superiority over his colleagues is likely far less deserved.
3. The Psychology of the Opinion-Writing Process
The psychology of the opinion-writing process may also help
explain absolutist rhetoric. Sometimes the writing process can help
convince the author of the manifest correctness of the position she
asserts.329 This is likely especially true for argumentative prose, like

the outcomes”); Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 23, at 134.
328. Indeed, in some cases, Justices on both sides of an issue will go out of their way to
contend that the other side badly misunderstood the law and facts. See, e.g., Parents Involved
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735-36 (2007) (plurality opinion)
(arguing that Justice Breyer’s dissent “selectively relies on inapplicable precedent and even
dicta while dismissing contrary holdings, alters and misapplies our well-established legal
framework for assessing equal protection challenges to express racial classifications, and
greatly exaggerates the consequences of today’s decision”); id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“The plurality pays inadequate attention to this law, to past opinions’ rationales, their
language, and the contexts in which they arise. As a result, it reverses course and reaches the
wrong conclusion.”).
329. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function,
96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1314-15 (2008).
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a judicial opinion, in which the writer’s primary objective is to support a given thesis.
The Court itself is aware of this phenomenon.330 The assigning
Justice recognizes that an authoring Justice can convince herself
during the drafting process, and consequently sometimes assigns an
opinion to a swing Justice in the hopes of holding together a fragile
majority.331 The Court, thus, has noticed the phenomenon psychologists call “self-generated persuasion,” in which a person generating
a message ends up believing the message more than she previously
had.332
The writing process, indeed, can involve not just the articulation
of thought, but also the “transformation of thought.”333 Occasionally,
a Justice realizes that an opinion “will not write” and changes his
vote or legal rationale.334 Sometimes, however, Justices conceal the
parts of the opinion that “will not write” and overemphasize the
parts of the opinion that will write.335 As Professor Chad Oldfather
explains, the writing process sometimes encourages writers to
overemphasize the verbalizable aspect of an explanation, producing
arguments that sound more ironclad than they really are.336
To this extent, the writing process sometimes subconsciously
leads a writer towards rhetorical absolutism as she tries to defend
an outcome as persuasively as possible.337 In trying to explain why
the arguments on one side of the ledger are more powerful than
those on the other, the writer sometimes finds it rhetorically easier
to reject one line of arguments entirely. It is pithier to dismiss a
counterargument categorically than to acknowledge its merit but
explain why, on balance, it should not prevail in a given context. It
also often sounds more persuasive. Thus, the writing process sometimes blinds the writer to alternative arguments and commits her
330. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 220, at 126-27.
331. See id.
332. See, e.g., Pablo Briñol et al., Self-Generated Persuasion: Effects of the Target and
Direction of Arguments, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 925, 925 (2012) (“In general,
whenever people engage in active construction and/or delivery of a persuasive message, it can
lead to attitude change in the transmitter.”).
333. See Oldfather, supra note 329, at 1306, 1315.
334. Id. at 1321, 1332.
335. See id. at 1332 (discussing verbal overshadowing).
336. See id.
337. See CARL BEREITER & MARLENE SCARDAMALIA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITTEN
COMPOSITION 302 (1987); Oldfather, supra note 329, at 1308.
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more fully to the line of reasoning upon which she has embarked.338
The writing process, then, can be a journey not only of discovery but
also of self-deception, sometimes exaggerating the relative persuasiveness of one line of argument while simultaneously down playing
the force of arguments supporting the opposite outcome.339
The writing process also forces the author to winnow down her
key points.340 It would be impossible (and unwise) for judges to
include every relevant point in an opinion. A Justice, then, must
make decisions about which arguments and facts to include. For
example, the judicial opinion must set forth a factual background
that boils down a complicated record into a concise, cohesive
narrative.341 This process necessarily requires a series of simplifications; a written appellate opinion simply cannot capture a case’s
complete record, which in turn cannot fully comprehend the actual
world’s rich complexity.342 Moreover, an authoring judge must
present the factual narrative so as to highlight those facts upon
which the decision’s legal holding rests.
The opinion-writing process, then, requires simplifications that
either deliberately or inadvertently can facilitate absolutism’s onesided worldview. The judge cannot depict the world from all possible
angles, so she must ignore arguments and facts that would needlessly clutter the opinion. But the decision about what to leave out
often involves value judgments. Some facts are plainly extraneous,
but some facts that seem extraneous to the majority may be critical
to the dissent.343 A judge hoping to write a concise opinion may end
up writing an absolutist one if she shortchanges points that are
crucial to the other side, or if she insists that her necessarily
simplified representation of the law or facts is indisputably correct.
338. See Oldfather, supra note 329, at 1314-15.
339. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 57.
340. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 157 (2005); Oldfather, supra note 329, at 1335.
341. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 150 (2002) (arguing that
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, Justice Cardozo depicted a very complicated event as “a
statement of clarity, symmetry, simplicity”).
342. See Ferguson, supra note 226, at 211 (“The judicial opinion then appropriates, molds,
and condenses that transcript in a far more cohesive narrative of judgment, one that gives the
possibility of final interpretation by turning original event into a legal incident for
judgment.”).
343. See supra Part I.B.5.
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4. The Justice as Advocate
A final critical factor shaping judicial rhetoric is that most
American judges are used to thinking and writing like advocates.
The advocate-turned-judge has great practice building a convincing
case and tearing down opposing arguments. Most judges, including
Supreme Court Justices, have spent large portions of their professional careers as lawyers and are accustomed to thinking along
adversarial lines. Indeed, starting in law school, the adversarial
style is so ingrained in the lawyer’s psyche that even the attorney
who has not spent most of her career litigating often writes like an
advocate.344 Judges, like most lawyers, then, have perfected the art
of making arguments and defeating opposing arguments; drafting
opinions in another style is psychologically very hard for them,
especially when colleagues advance contrary arguments inviting
rebuttal.345
In an adversarial system, it is entirely appropriate that lawyers
argue their side as strongly as they can while simultaneously trying
to rebut the opposing side. Indeed, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct require lawyers to represent their side “zealously.”346
Towards this end, lawyers understandably feel the need to press
their arguments with great confidence.347
Justices, of course, no longer represent clients. However, when
people have written and thought in this adversarial style for
decades, transitioning to another form of thinking and writing is
often hard, especially when the status quo is for judges to write very
much in the same style as lawyers.348 Because lawyers have often
344. See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors As Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1503-10 (2010) (discussing the “extreme adversarialism” of the American legal system);
Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law Schools: A Critical Assessment,
24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992) (describing the adversarial nature of the U.S. legal curriculum).
345. See Berger, supra note 79, at 366; supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
346. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2013).
347. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 23, at 136.
348. See Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal
Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 85 (1998) (“Repeated exposure to adversaries’
arguments, set up as opposing poles, establish a habit of mind for judges who in turn write
opinions as though they present a preordained correct answer, which embraces by necessity
only one position or viewpoint.”); Posner, supra note 281, at 6 (“A lawyer is a practicing lawyer
one day, and a judge the next. There is no transition, no (or very little) training for the new
career, and so it is natural for the lawyer newly appointed a judge to continue with as little
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been trained to eschew doubt, many lawyers may see judicial doubt
not as a reflection of intellectual honesty but rather as an admission
that a judge is deciding based on personal values.349 We should not
be surprised, then, to find that the Justices’ opinions read a lot like
lawyers’ briefs—emphasizing their strongest points, trying to
conceal or explain away their weakest points, and dismissing
counterarguments.350 Some judges may consciously choose this
rhetorical style, but many may simply fall into it because they have
been doing it for decades.351
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Costs
1. The Politics of Cultural Disdain
The Supreme Court’s constitutional opinions obviously matter
insofar as they shape constitutional doctrine, but they also play an
important role in a broader national constitutional discussion.
Although most Americans swear fealty to the Constitution as our
civic religion,352 they disagree strenuously about what it means.
Indeed, the country’s collective view of its founding document is
emphatically pluralistic, embracing numerous values, some in sharp
tension with each other.353 These differences reflect not just political
disagreement about single issues but deeper discord over our
change as possible his accustomed approach.”).
349. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 60.
350. See Berger, supra note 79, at 366.
351. By contrast, in some countries, judges are career judges, not former lawyers who have
“lateraled” into judicial positions. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 84 (2d ed. 1999). Although there are undoubtedly great
advantages to having the bench consist of accomplished lawyers, such judges also bring with
them the bar’s professional biases and rhetorical conventions. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN
& ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 103-04 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that in some countries,
high court judges will have served their entire career as judges and, never having practiced,
“will see the law solely from the judge’s point of view”); John D. Jackson & Nikolay P.
Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 93-100
(2006) (discussing lay judges); Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1569, 1586-91 (2007).
352. See LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 10, 17.
353. See id. at 17.
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national identity.354 The tone of the Court’s treatment of these
sensitive issues thus affects important discourse about the very
nature of American democracy.
In light of these high stakes, absolutist constitutional rhetoric
runs the risk of unduly alienating litigation losers, sending the
message that they are cultural outsiders whose understandings of
our nation’s core values are fundamentally incorrect.355 To be sure,
defeated litigants naturally will be disappointed. That said, many
decisions are context-specific,356 deciding a constitutional question
only in the narrow confines of the factual scenario presented. An
opinion’s rhetoric can therefore help determine whether interest
groups supporting losing litigants feel mild disappointment, bitter
alienation, or something in between.357
Indeed, a decision’s cultural ramifications extend far beyond the
legal community. Interest groups and the (often partisan) media
report decisions to the broader citizenry, who in turn, fiercely debate
the decision’s wisdom. While the general public usually focuses on
a case’s outcome, the opinion’s language signals the Court’s level of
respect for the competing values at issue. When an opinion dismissively rejects the norms on one side of the constitutional ledger, the
Court appears indifferent to the harms its opinion may inflict on the
losing side.358 It may, indeed, even sometimes indicate that the
harm is deserved.359 Although losing litigants inevitably experience
some sense of loss, as Professor Emily Calhoun argues, those harms
354. See id. at 9-17.
355. See EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE: HARMS OF INDIFFERENCE IN THE SUPREME
COURT 3 (2011) (arguing that if the Justices do not ameliorate harm, constitutional losers
experience injustice that adds fuel to their deeply felt personal outrage).
356. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1996) (discussing the role of context in judicial
minimalism).
357. See Timothy P. O’Neill, Law and “The Argumentative Theory,” 90 OR. L. REV. 837, 848
(2012) (“When a judicial opinion—especially a U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion in a fiveto-four case—is couched in completely unequivocal language, its message to the other side is:
‘You’re wrong. And, by the way, you are stupid and perhaps dishonest, too.’ ”).
358. Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES
153-54 (1979) (“It is a propensity of professionals in the legal process to dehumanize by legal
concepts those whom the law affects harshly.”); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (“Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of
violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result,
somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.”).
359. CALHOUN, supra note 355, at 8.
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might be magnified when the Court disrespects their basic
positions.360
Absolutist rhetoric can also distort an ongoing constitutional
debate.361 For example, as noted above, though Heller announced
that certain gun regulations would likely be constitutional,362
popular discussion of the Second Amendment, latching onto the
opinion’s strong rhetoric, often assumes that any regulation of
firearms is unconstitutional. For example, local sheriffs, citing an
absolutist Second Amendment, announced recently that they would
not enforce certain state gun laws,363 because, as one sheriff
explained, “[i]n my oath it says I’ll uphold the U.S. Constitution.”364
Similarly, Guns & Ammo magazine recently dismissed a pro-gun
columnist for having the audacity to remind readers that constitutional rights are never absolute.365 Rather than examining the
constitutional merits of various hypothetical regulations, the
magazine’s editors insisted that no such regulation was constitutional and that all attempts to regulate firearms reflected “powerful
forces in this country who will do anything to destroy the Second
Amendment.”366 Of course, Heller did not cause these attitudes; the
National Rifle Association (NRA) vigorously advocated for absolute
gun rights long before that decision. But Justice Scalia’s rhetoric in
Heller provided further grist for the NRA’s mill.367 To this extent,
absolutist language, even if tempered by a nuanced holding, can
become amplified as interest groups disseminate it to the public.

360. See id. at 24 (arguing that it is not unreasonable “for constitutional losers to expect
Justices to write opinions that manifest a respect for the equal moral and political agency of
losers”).
361. Cf. Guinier, supra note 30, at 60 (“[T]he beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors are
influenced by the judiciary’s internal perspective on the meaning of law.”).
362. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
363. See Erica Goode, Sheriffs Refuse to Enforce Laws on Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2013, at A1.
364. Id. at A17.
365. Ravi Somaiya, Banished for Questioning the Gospel of Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014,
at A1.
366. Id.
367. See Nancy Smith, Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s Gun-Control Firebomb, SUNSHINE STATE
NEWS (Jan. 7, 2013, 3:55 AM), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/sen-dianne-feinsteinsgun-control-firebomb [http://perma.cc/K8TF-4JMB] (summarizing the view that gun regulations violate Heller).
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A plausible effect of absolutist rhetoric, then, is that it may
sometimes help cut off deeper debate.368 Opinions that entirely
reject one side’s constitutional vision can simultaneously alienate
opponents and dull the critical sensibilities of supporters.369 In both
cases, they deepen the potential for political discord.370 When
partisan ideologues can cite Supreme Court language to brandish
their contempt for their opponents, the ensuing conversation is less
likely to include careful discussion. Democracy usually works better
when debate is careful and informed.371 Rather than encouraging
depth, absolutist rhetoric encourages people to recast arguments to
render them either congenial or not to their views, refusing to
acknowledge the law’s complexities and internal tensions.
This phenomenon can extend also to the Court’s absolutist factual
statements, which contribute to the related problem of balkanized
knowledge and understanding.372 The majority and dissenting
opinions in Shelby County painted fundamentally different portraits
of racial discrimination and voting rights in the predominantly
southern jurisdictions covered under section 4 of the VRA.373 Such
one-sided depictions of the world both reflect and perpetuate the
problem of balkanized knowledge in which different groups’ factual
beliefs are governed substantially by their ideological views.374
Partially as a result of these deep epistemological differences,
conservatives and liberals do not just disagree on questions of
constitutional application; they “know” different things about the
document’s fundamental “truths.”375 Sympathetic audiences, then,
are more likely to assume their normative preferences are “strong

368. See Kahan, supra note 4, at 21.
369. Id.
370. See, e.g., id. at 61 (arguing that pronouncements of certitude can deepen group-based
conflict); David A. Strauss, Principle and its Perils, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 386 (1997)
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996)).
371. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER: RUSH LIMBAUGH
AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT 245 (2008).
372. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 53-54 (2001) (arguing that the Internet helps
insulate audiences from more diverse viewpoints).
373. See supra Part I.B.5.
374. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 372, at 57 (“[W]hen options are so plentiful, many people
will take the opportunity to listen to those points of view that they find most agreeable.”).
375. Cf. JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 371, at 191.
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[a]s proofs of holy writ”376 when Justices they admire vindicate those
preferences with great confidence.377 Indeed, given that many
Americans stick to news sources confirming their preexisting
political inclinations,378 it is unsurprising that the Justices’ absolutism would be transmitted to people hungry for evidence that
bolsters their own one-sided attitudes. This phenomenon, thus,
might further balkanize groups whose visions of our basic political
structure grow still farther apart.379 As Professors Simon and
Scurich put it, “judicial one-sidedness pushes the opposing parties
further apart ... entrench[ing] the boundaries that separate people
... [and] solidif[ying] parochialism.”380
This all may contribute to a culture of political disdain.381
Extreme rhetoric can slide into hyper-partisan rage, in which
audiences angrily condemn political opponents.382 The opposing side
is not simply wrong, but disingenuous, stupid, unpatriotic, and even
morally repugnant. Of course, some absolutist rhetoric is more
polite than others, but the high stakes of constitutional controversies often provoke strong responses. The result can be a vicious
circle of disrespect that transcends ordinary democratic disagreement. To this extent, rhetorical excess is self-perpetuating, with
each side angrily denouncing the other.
This poisonous political culture can interfere with sensible governance.383 People who accept an absolutist view of the Constitution
are more likely to see the Constitution as an ideological battleground, rendering compromise politically impossible.384 After all, if
the other side has committed heresy by desecrating the country’s
secular religion, then compromising with opponents would be akin
to a covenant with the devil. One-time allies who depart from the
acceptable agenda are therefore iconoclasts. For example, after the
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 3, sc. 3, ll.
See Kahan, supra note 4, at 21.
See id.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 372, at 59-60.
Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 421.
See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED
AMERICA 1-7 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing contemporary political observers’ characterization of
Americans as deeply politically divided); SUSAN HERBST, RUDE DEMOCRACY: CIVILITY AND
INCIVILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1-3 (2010).
382. See JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 371, at 246.
383. Id. at 246-47.
384. See id. at 246.
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Supreme Court upheld much of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Glenn Beck made a t-shirt with the word
“coward” under an image of Chief Justice Roberts.385
In light of the prevailing “political outrage carnival,”386 it is easy
to see why Congress in recent years has been mostly paralyzed. Our
Constitution requires bicameralism and presentment for legislation
to become law,387 and those constitutional requirements, combined
with other vetogates, such as the Senate filibuster, make it difficult
to pass legislation even in eras of relative political calm.388 Popular
absolutist rhetoric makes it still harder to achieve any kind of
meaningful compromise, because politicians and their constituents
on both sides are convinced that the other side fundamentally
misunderstands America’s constitutional foundations.389 The result
is a policy-making logjam and a Congress that now routinely
neglects crucial matters like the budget and the debt ceiling.390 Of
course, many other factors contribute to our current political
dysfunction,391 but rhetoric that discourages all political cooperation
surely plays some role.392
The Court’s absolutist rhetoric thus plausibly contributes, albeit
modestly, to a culture in which political enemies treat Court
decisions like “the spoils of war”393 and wield the Constitution as a
385. See Glenn Beck Sells T-Shirts Calling Justice Roberts “Coward,” HUFFINGTON POST
(June 29, 2012, 2:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/29/glenn-beck-sells-tshirts_n_1638229.html [http://perma.cc/RS4G-RJAB].
386. Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and
Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375,
388 (2012).
387. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The exception, of course, is when Congress overrides
a presidential veto.
388. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1448 (2008).
389. See JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 371, at 246.
390. Massaro & Stryker, supra note 386, at 388.
391. See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA 11 (2006) (describing empirical
evidence that politicians have become increasingly polarized along ideological lines); Richard
H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 287-324 (2011) (examining causes of hyperpolarized democracy in America).
392. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF
EXTREMISM 63 (2012) (discussing the pernicious influence of “the bombastic and blustering
figures in the political culture”).
393. CALHOUN, supra note 355, at 108.
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clumsy weapon in political debate. Of course, social reactions to
Supreme Court constitutional decisions depend on the particulars,
and losing groups likely will dispute the Court’s decisions regardless
of its rhetorical tone. But the Court’s tone, nonetheless, indicates its
degree of respect for a particular conception of America and
therefore can help color the terms of future discourse.394 It also can
model the terms of future debate. Indeed, a sarcastic, dismissive
opinion can indicate to law students—tomorrow’s future lawyers
and leaders—that such rhetoric is appropriate in formal legal
settings.395
It is important not to overstate the point. The Court’s role in
contemporary political dysfunction is modest, and the role of its
rhetoric, as distinct from its holdings, is likely even smaller. Elected
public officials and media pundits play a much bigger role in shaping the country’s political culture and discourse.396 Moreover, the
street here runs two ways; just as the Court’s rhetoric can modestly
shape popular discourse, so too can popular constitutionalism seep
into judicial rulings.397 For example, Tea Party and broader conservative hostility to the ACA may well have helped shape judicial
attitudes towards the constitutional challenge. When groups
initially challenged the ACA’s individual mandate on Commerce
Clause grounds, many observers considered the argument frivolous.398 As conservative and libertarian activists pressed their
arguments, however, the constitutional argument against the mandate began to filter into the legal and cultural mainstream.399 The
vigor of the popular movement may have helped persuade the public
and some judges that a Commerce Clause challenge originally perceived to be “off the wall” might in fact be correct.400 Nevertheless,
394. See id. at 8-9.
395. Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at 2022.
396. See FIORINA ET AL., supra note 381, at 1-10 (discussing contemporary political
observers’ characterization of Americans as deeply politically divided).
397. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 367-68 (arguing that when the Court declares
unconstitutional actions of other branches, they often reflect the will of the people); Lain,
supra note 15, at 117 (arguing that sometimes the Supreme Court is better at responding to
widespread changing attitudes than the political branches); Post, supra note 30, at 8.
398. See Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 325, 331
(2013) (noting that the challenge initially seemed “off the wall”).
399. Id. at 331-34.
400. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-91 (2012); Blackman,
supra note 398, at 333-34.
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though constitutional culture surely sometimes helps shape
constitutional law, so too can the Court’s rhetoric color our broader
national political dialogue, sometimes for the worse.
2. Judicial Legitimacy
Even though the Court may sometimes use absolutist constitutional rhetoric to bolster the rule of law,401 that same rhetoric can
also undermine its own institutional legitimacy. National perceptions of the Supreme Court are not favorable. According to recent
polls, the Supreme Court’s approval rating in 2012 fell to 50
percent, and 82 percent of Americans believe that the Justices
decide cases based on their personal views.402
Public perception is not wholly mistaken. Political scientists have
developed a sophisticated attitudinal model demonstrating that
political preferences matter in judicial decision making.403 But it is
one thing for Justices to vote with their political preferences in a
close case with compelling legal arguments on both sides. It is
something quite different for them to ignore clear law in straightforward cases, and the evidence showing that Justices do this is far
weaker.404 To the contrary, the Justices’ own norms and ideologies
are most likely to sway their decisions when things are unclear—when there are legal gaps to fill or complicated factual
landscapes to assess.405

401. See supra Part II.A.3.
402. See, e.g., Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in
WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE
306, 308 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); B. Jessie Hill, Resistance to Constitutional Theory:
The Supreme Court, Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,” 91 TEX. L. REV.
1815, 1816 (2013).
403. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 433 (2002) (“The fact remains that the ideology of the Justices
drives their decisions.”); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American
Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (synthesizing studies measuring the
connection between judicial ideology and behavior).
404. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 4 (“[T]here is a space between ironclad
logic and unrestrained discretion.”).
405. See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision
Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 530 (2013); Tamanaha, supra note 254, at 774.
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Ordinary citizens, however, usually do not make these distinctions.406 Partisan talking heads, unsurprisingly, contribute to the
problem, overstating the role of ideology in judicial decision
making.407 The Court itself, however, also deserves some blame.
Indeed, the Justices help sow cynicism about their own institution
when they insist that 5-4 cases have clear answers and that
dissenting arguments are “worthy of the Mad Hatter.”408 It is easier
for the lay person to see judicial decisions as unduly political if the
Justices punctuate their internal disagreements by characterizing
the law as objective and each other as mad.409
Absolutist rhetoric, in fact, abandons important judicial principles. Judges should explain their opinions with “reasoned elaboration”410 and be willing to entertain new ideas and subject favored
views to careful scrutiny.411 When Justices use absolutist rhetoric,
they at least appear to have abandoned that commitment to
neutrality and care. Similarly, when a Justice’s explanation fails to
give competing arguments fair treatment, that explanation, no
matter how otherwise rigorous, will seem less persuasive to many
fair-minded, critical readers. While only a small percentage of the
population reads Supreme Court decisions closely, some of those
readers share their unfavorable reactions in blogs and news reports.
Consequently, a judicial culture that consistently denigrates the
other side can undermine the public’s faith in a fair-minded,
impartial judiciary. To this extent, Justices’ overzealous use of
absolutist rhetoric may reflect too great a willingness to win the
406. See William J. Daniels, The Supreme Court and Its Publics, 37 ALB. L. REV. 632, 63638 (1972) (describing the breadth and depth of the general public’s knowledge about Supreme
Court decisions and concluding that the public is not very knowledgeable about the Supreme
Court).
407. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING
AMERICA 10 (2005) (“[J]udges have abused their constitutional mandate by imposing their
personal prejudices and beliefs on the rest of society.”); MARK W. SMITH, DISROBED: THE NEW
BATTLE PLAN TO BREAK THE LEFT’S STRANGLEHOLD ON THE COURTS 11 (2006) (“Judges ...
function as politicians wearing black robes.”).
408. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589 (2008).
409. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 7 (2012) (“[W]e
are asked by each side to believe that its disinterested reading leads to this result, while the
other side’s manipulation of text and history amounts to a cynical, politically motivated effort
to distort the Constitution’s true meaning.”).
410. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 143-52 (William N.
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
411. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 91.
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battle over a particular case without larger regard for the war over
the Court’s institutional legitimacy.
Absolutist rhetoric also may diminish the Court’s collegiality,
which in turn may marginally affect the public’s opinion of it. The
Court probably functions more collegially than most American
governmental institutions,412 but absolutist rhetoric may sour
relationships between the Justices. Justice Scalia’s acerbic style, in
particular, has reportedly alienated Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.413 Although most members of the public do not pay close
attention to these interpersonal politics, diminished collegiality and
disrespectful opinions can give the general impression of a divided
institution, which, in turn, can undermine the public’s confidence.414
Finally, some actors may be inclined to disregard absolutist
opinions. After all, because absolutist opinions generally overstate
their supporting reasoning, the Court in future cases may not take
them seriously.415 Additionally, absolutist dissents may imply that
lower courts should not be too stringent in applying or extending a
majority opinion.416 Similarly, street-level bureaucrats sometimes
misunderstand absolutist majority opinions as permitting them to
ignore otherwise applicable laws so as not to violate constitutional
norms.417 Moreover, even when lower courts and executive officials
wish to follow precedent faithfully, they may have difficulty
identifying the portions of an absolutist opinion that constitute its
core holding as distinct from rhetorical embellishment. Thus,
absolutism’s implicit message that the Court is just applying the
412. See Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. Oct. 14, 2013, at 27,
available at http://perma.cc/3KWY-7Z6S (discussing Supreme Court collegiality).
413. See Aaron Epstein, The Interpreter and the Establishment Clause, in A YEAR IN THE
LIFE OF THE SUPREME COURT 126, 136 (Rodney A. Smolla ed., 1995) (noting that Justice
Anthony Kennedy disliked Justice Scalia’s acerbic rhetoric); William K. Kelley, Justice
Antonin Scalia and the Long Game, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1601, 1603 (2012) (noting that
Justice Scalia’s style is “said to have fairly seriously alienated Justice O’Connor”).
414. Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 429 (1986)
(“[C]ollegiality is important.”).
415. Simon & Scurich, supra note 6, at 419.
416. Tushnet, supra note 233, at xiii.
417. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 363, at A1 (discussing local sheriffs opting not to follow
state gun control laws due to Second Amendment concerns). See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980)
(discussing how public service workers have and employ considerable discretion in implementing public programs).
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law may ironically undermine both the rule of law and the Court’s
own legitimacy.
3. Constitutional Misconceptions
Another potential cost of constitutional absolutism is that it
pretends that constitutional answers come more easily than they do.
In this regard, absolutist rhetoric perpetuates misconceptions about
the nature of constitutional law and judicial constitutional decision
making. Even if one prefers legal formalism in which clear rules
point towards correct answers, many Justices on the Court do not
understand constitutional adjudication in such terms.418 Justice
Holmes may have somewhat overstated the matter when he
asserted that “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience,”419 but he was certainly correct that logic alone does not
forge the law’s path.420 Absolutist opinions’ conceit that their conclusions merely reflect the law’s mandate misrepresents the role that
less tangible factors, like experience, play in shaping the law.
Furthermore, the very diversity of the Justices’ own approaches to
constitutional interpretation necessarily renders constitutional law
unpredictable.
Rhetorical absolutism, then, likely perpetuates the misconception of a monistic Constitution that contains easy and obvious
answers.421 Unlike many statutes, the Constitution’s text is old and
underdeterminate. Unlike some foreign constitutions, it also lacks
interpretive instructions.422 Constitutional history and precedent are
both rich and complicated. Moreover, the modalities of constitutional decision making are numerous, drawing on text, structure,
418. See Sullivan, supra note 237, at 26.
419. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881); see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 4-5 (arguing that both logic
and experience shape the law).
420. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 4 (noting that it is “fruitless” to try to
eliminate the middle ground between logic and discretion in constitutional decision making).
421. This is not to say that there are never straightforward constitutional answers. For instance, the President must be at least thirty-five years old. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
422. For example, section 39 of the South African Constitution provides instructions on
how courts should interpret the Bill of Rights provisions of that Constitution. See S. AFR.
CONST., 1996 § 39; KENDE, supra note 267, at 8 (discussing the South African Constitution’s
interpretive instructions).
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history, precedent, policy, and more.423 Given that constitutional
decision making can be approached from so many directions—each
complicated—answers to many constitutional cases do not come
easily.424
Some constitutional cases also present conflicts between constitutional principles, thus pitting not a right against a wrong, but a
right against a right.425 Justice Souter may have dismissed competing arguments too quickly in Rosenberger,426 but he articulated this
point powerfully in a commencement address at Harvard:
Not even [the Constitution’s] most uncompromising and
unconditional language can resolve every potential tension of
one provision with another, tension the Constitution’s Framers
left to be resolved another day .... [These] tensions ... are the ...
creatures of our aspirations: to value liberty, as well as order,
and fairness and equality, as well as liberty. And the very
opportunity for conflict between one high value and another
reflects our confidence that a way may be found to resolve it
when a conflict arises. That is why the simplistic view of the
Constitution devalues our aspirations, and attacks that ...
confidence.427

Indeed, the absolutist view of the Constitution is contrary to the
document’s spirit and history.428 The Framers themselves agreed on
very little, and ended up creating a document that satisfied no one

423. See BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 12-13, 22.
424. Cf. id. at 11-22 (discussing the different ways of analyzing constitutional questions
and the results of each).
425. Cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 5 (rev. ed. 2001) (“I must constantly choose among competing and
apparently incommensurable goods and that circumstances may force me to a position in
which I cannot help being false to something or doing some wrong.”).
426. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
427. Justice David H. Souter, Commencement Address at Harvard University (May 27,
2010), in HARVARD GAZETTE, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justicedavid-souters-speech/ [http://perma.cc/4PWN-UXDB].
428. Cf. id. (“[T]he Constitution is no simple contract, not because it uses a certain amount
of open-ended language that a contract draftsman would try to avoid, but because its language
grants and guarantees many good things, and good things that compete with each other and
can never all be realized, all together, all at once.”).
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entirely,429 punting many important issues to future generations.430
It was generally understood that the document’s meaning would
have to be “liquidated” through the generations.431 Above all else,
the story of 1787 is the story of statesmen who compromised,
putting aside deep ideological differences to craft an imperfect but
pragmatic Constitution that they hoped would save their young
country.432 This history, of course, is not decisive in any constitutional conflict today, but it does belie the notion that the answers
should come easily. To the extent constitutional absolutists would
have us believe otherwise, they distort the very tradition they
purport to revere.
4. Misplaced Piety
Finally, absolutist rhetoric can encourage unthinking respect for
the Constitution.433 Many people fill the Constitution with their own
content. When an individual favoring a particular outcome sees a
Justice arguing strenuously in favor of that same outcome, she is
more likely to latch onto those arguments rather than seek a second
opinion. Many Americans revere the Constitution, but it is often a
sound-bite Constitution containing fragments of meaning used to
support a single-minded, partisan goal.
The Constitution may underpin our civic religion, but thoughtless
piety is a shaky foundation upon which to rest the nation’s faith.434
Although the Constitution’s advantages may well outweigh its

429. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 158-65 (2d ed. 2005).
430. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 567 (1994).
431. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 179, 182 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“All
new laws ... are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”).
432. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 17871788, at 472 (2010); DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, THE ORIGINAL COMPROMISE: WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS WERE REALLY THINKING 14-15 (2d ed. 2013) (“Political calculation,
negotiation, and compromise inevitably shaped the document that evolved at the
Convention.”); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361, 364 (2004) (describing the Framers’ underlying principle as “pragmatic”).
433. See LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 54.
434. See id. at 4.
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disadvantages, it is far from a perfect document.435 Certainly, its
original conception was deeply flawed, as abolitionists like William
Lloyd Garrison emphasized when they publicly burned the document, denouncing it as a “covenant with death.”436 Although no
provision surviving today is morally despicable like the original proslavery provisions, reasonable people of good faith question the
wisdom of other provisions, including, among others, the undemocratic nature of the Senate;437 the ambiguity of the Article II
executive powers;438 the electoral college system;439 and the difficulty
of formal amendments under Article V.440 Moreover, given recent
political standoffs over the budget and debt ceiling, reasonable
people may wonder whether the numerous obstacles to legislation
are wise.441
Amending these or other constitutional provisions would be
extremely difficult,442 but as Professor Levinson has argued, merely
having a conversation about our Constitution’s strengths and
weaknesses would be a valuable national exercise.443 Indeed, even
if the Constitution emerged unchanged, such attention could force
Congress to reconsider the wisdom of legislative vetogates enacted
by congressional rule.444 In other words, we may not be able to

435. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 20-21 (2006);
Souter, supra note 427.
436. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 120 (1988).
437. See LEVINSON, supra note 435, at 108 (describing congressional gridlock that blocks
the effective making of public policy).
438. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 553 (2004) (describing the textual uncertainty in the Article
II grant of powers to the executive).
439. Joy McAfee, 2001: Should the College Electors Finally Graduate? The Electoral
College: An American Compromise From its Inception to Election 2000, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 643,
644-45 (2002) (summarizing arguments against the electoral college method of electing the
president).
440. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) (proposing a new amendment process).
441. See LEVINSON, supra note 435, at 108.
442. See Akhil Reed Amar & Sanford Levinson, What Do We Talk About When We Talk
About the Constitution?, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1133, 1138 (2013) (reviewing AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICAN’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY
(2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE (2012)).
443. LEVINSON, supra note 435, at 178-80.
444. See id. at 180.
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change the Constitution itself, but we may reconsider related
features of our system.
Of course, such a discussion could also identify the Constitution’s
many virtues and the stability resulting from its long endurance.
For instance, even though this country’s political gridlock can be
very damaging, it is not clear that parliamentary systems, which
generally can respond more quickly to problems, have dealt any
better with the recent global financial crisis. Moreover, as Professor
Akhil Amar puts it, although foreign parliamentary systems
typically have less gridlock, they have “offsetting pathologies,” such
as permitting plurality parties without a national mandate to effect
major change.445 Consequently, policy can shift quite dramatically
sometimes as the result of a single election with low turnout.446
It is important, then, to realize that our system has both advantages and disadvantages. But Americans rarely discuss the relative
merits of their political system because it is heretical to suggest that
the Constitution is anything short of perfect. In short, the nation
has succumbed to the mindless piety that Thomas Jefferson
lamented when he observed in his contemporaries a “sanctimonious
reverence” for the Constitution and its Framers.447
The great irony is that excessive constitutional piety can also be
seen as a sign of disrespect. If most people revere the Constitution
because they believe it protects their own political commitments,
then as a nation, we consider it easily manipulated. Of course, to the
extent that many constitutional questions are open to debate, this
view has some truth in it, but it is likely not the vision of the Constitution that many Americans think they are venerating. Perhaps this
flexibility is precisely why the Constitution endures and deserves
celebration, but this point is hardly explicit in most of our national
constitutional conversation. Admittedly, misplaced piety is not a
grave threat to the republic. Nevertheless, this piety also speaks to
a faith that has yet to deepen through self-questioning.

445. Amar & Levinson, supra note 442, at 1132.
446. See id.
447. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 367 (1996) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
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B. Benefits
1. Legal Stability and the Rule of Law
The rhetoric of constitutional absolutism also offers benefits.448
Most obviously, strong rhetoric announces judicial decisions with
confidence, presenting a solid foundation upon which to build a legal
doctrine and bind society. The Supreme Court lacks direct democratic accountability, but it can persuade the political branches and
citizens to obey its orders by insisting on the requirements of the
rule of law. Absolutist rhetoric, thus, reflects some Justices’ belief
that the law needs to speak forcefully if unelected judges are to
assert their authority over more democratically accountable
governmental officials.449 Were the Court to concede legal uncertainty, it would risk undermining that authority.
Relatedly, absolutist rhetoric implicitly promises legal clarity and
stability. Whereas more equivocal opinions might cause some to
wonder whether the law might change, absolutist rhetoric can help
foster consistency, another important component of the rule of
law.450 After all, it should be possible to foresee “with fair certainty”
how the government will use its coercive power in various circumstances,451 and absolutist rhetoric implies that constitutional rules
will not change. By contrast, a Court that does not sound like it
believes in its own rulings will not foster such confidence.
Such legal clarity is important generally, but it is especially
important in certain kinds of prominent, morally charged constitutional cases. Perhaps the best example is Brown v. Board of

448. These benefits overlap somewhat with the strategic explanations discussed previously.
See supra Part II.A.
449. See Post, supra note 30, at 11 (“Judges and lawyers will continue to appeal to the
autonomy of constitutional law ... precisely to the extent that they believe that an independent and determinative constitutional law is the necessary foundation for judicial authority
to constrain democratic legislation.”).
450. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63 (2d ed. 1969) (“[C]larity represents one
of the most essential ingredients of legality.”); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
72 (1944) (“[G]overnment in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced
beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will
use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis
of this knowledge.”).
451. HAYEK, supra note 450, at 72.
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Education, which, of course, invalidated school segregation.452
Though accepted today as constitutional gospel, Brown was very
controversial in its day, especially in the segregated South.453 Brown
may have failed in the short term to desegregate many southern
public schools,454 but its symbolic importance was tremendous.455
Though Brown said very little and did not condemn the immorality
of segregation so much as emphasize its adverse consequences,456
the Court’s decision was firm and unanimous, thus ushering in a
new era of equal protection law.457 Had the Court in Brown spoken
more equivocally of the constitutional norms involved, the South
could have emphasized the decision’s uncertain tone, thereby
undermining its symbolic power.458 On this account, confident
language can help send a powerful message to the entire country
about important constitutional and moral norms.
Absolutist opinions also more easily achieve internal coherence.
A concession in Heller that the historical and textual evidence was
collectively ambiguous would have partially undermined the
legitimacy of the Second Amendment right. After all, given the
Court’s originalist analysis, the right emanated directly from such
evidence.459 Graham, too, would have been harder to write had the
Court conceded its inconsistent methodologies for determining a
national consensus.460 Similarly, Shelby County’s decision to strike
452. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
453. See Ashley Doty, The Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 4 LAW & SOC’Y J. U.C.
SANTA BARBARA 111, 115 (2005) (explaining that after Brown judges were “subject to
intimidation and threats to the safety of themselves and their families” if they ruled against
segregation).
454. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 157 (2007) (discussing Brown’s initial ineffectiveness in desegregating the South);
J. W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 93 (1961) (discussing the ineffective implementation of Brown); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 50 (1991)
(showing how slowly schools integrated).
455. See KLARMAN, supra note 454, at 160.
456. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
457. Following Brown, the Supreme Court invalidated segregation in numerous other
contexts. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (holding bus
segregation unconstitutional); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (enjoining segregation on public beaches and in bathhouses).
458. See Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at 2033-34.
459. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
460. See supra Part I.B.4.
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down the preclearance coverage formula would have been harder to
justify had the majority tempered its story of racial progress with
examples of continued voter discrimination.461 And Citizens United
would have read very differently had the majority actually engaged
with evidence demonstrating that powerful corporations enthusiastically spend money to curry favor with dependent political candidates who, once elected, support legislation friendly to those
corporations.462 Perhaps the Court would have still found that the
corporations’ free speech interests should prevail, but the Court
would have had more difficulty rejecting the contention that the
BCRA provisions at issue furthered a compelling governmental
interest. Equivocal opinions, then, can be harder to write and less
internally coherent.
Although it is important not to confuse tone with content, more
moderately toned opinions may gravitate towards narrow holdings
that leave a great deal open for future cases to resolve. There are
certainly benefits to leaving issues undecided,463 but courts that do
so often fail to provide guidance to lower courts.464 Justice O’Connor’s Rosenberger concurrence intelligently recognized the competing values at issue in that case but provided minimal guidance on
how to resolve the doctrinal collision.465 In theory, it is possible to
imagine a conciliatory opinion that acknowledges the strong arguments on both sides of a question while simultaneously laying down
a clear rule that can be applied easily in future cases. In practice,
such an opinion is much harder to write.
2. Civic Engagement
Absolutist rhetoric can also help promote civic engagement with
constitutional issues by clarifying the fundamental grounds of constitutional dispute. Cultural intermediaries, in turn, can more easily
transmit these clearer legal visions to the general public. Whereas
461. See supra Part I.B.5.
462. See Teachout, supra note 128, at 318-22 (discussing the kind of “material description”
that was “missing” in Citizens United and may have made a “great deal of difference”); supra
note 126 and accompanying text.
463. See Sunstein, supra note 356, at 7-9 (discussing the benefits of judicial minimalism).
464. See Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 1989.
465. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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more compromising opinions, with their careful parsing of doctrinal
intricacies and factual distinctions, can confuse and bore the general
public, absolutist opinions engage their audience with a stronger
sense of constitutional battle lines.466
Like religious sects skirmishing over whose faith is more authentic, jurists and others wielding absolutist rhetoric likely speak
more to the faithful than to their opponents.467 Justices probably
understand that strong language will rarely convert an opponent.
However, such rhetoric can help inspire loyalty from the committed,
thus helping to galvanize ideological allies.
In that way, absolutist opinions can mobilize the public and
encourage non-lawyers to articulate their own constitutional visions. Such opinions arm citizens with points to argue their side
more effectively.468 Far from alienating members of the public, this
kind of rhetoric might in fact encourage constitutional debate and
eventually spawn new constitutional understandings.469 Indeed,
though some people may be turned off by strong rhetoric, it may
actually increase popular political engagement.470 In the nineteenth
century, for instance, when newspapers were often “organs” of political parties,471 voting rates were high by contemporary standards.472
Similarly, U.S. politics are highly polarized today, and yet voter
turnout in the past two presidential elections has been comparatively high.473 Strong rhetoric, whatever its drawbacks, then, may

466. Cf. Guinier, supra note 30, at 117 (arguing that minority viewpoints can gain support
when dissents speak to a nonlegal public in language ordinary people can understand).
467. See generally Gregory Brazeal, Constitutional Fundamentalism 6 (Jan. 9, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/YM7R-LFMX (comparing constitutional fundamentalists to religious fundamentalists).
468. Cf. JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 371, at 243-44 (discussing the positive effects
of one-sided conservative media on its audience).
469. Siegel, supra note 40, at 1329 (“Typically, it is only through sustained conflict that
alternative understandings are honed into a form that officials can enforce and the public will
recognize as the Constitution.”).
470. See ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 260, at 18-19 (arguing that the American public’s interest
in politics has increased as the Democratic and Republican parties have become increasingly
polarized along ideological lines).
471. See HOWE, supra note 106, at 228.
472. See JAMIESON & CAPPELLA, supra note 371, at 242.
473. See Alex Bryson et al., Workplace Voice and Civic Engagement: What Theory and Data
Tell Us About Unions and Their Relationship to the Democratic Process, 50 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 965, 966 n.1 (2013).
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help inspire democratic engagement over the country’s first
principles.474
C. Other Implications and Tensions
Absolutist rhetoric carries other implications that are not so easily categorized as costs or benefits. In particular, absolutist rhetoric
can both advance and obstruct other values that the Court sometimes champions: judicial supremacy, minimalism, indeterminacy,
and candor. Reasonable people can debate whether these are worthy
goals for the judiciary, but absolutist rhetoric’s tension with each of
them suggests, unsurprisingly, that the Court’s commitment to each
of these values is case-specific and contingent on other factors.
1. The Tension Between Judicial Supremacy and Popular
Constitutionalism
The rhetoric of constitutional absolutism implies judicial
supremacy. By insisting that a particular constitutional answer is
manifestly correct, the Justices suggest that their interpretation is
definitive and binding.475 In this way, absolutist rhetoric seeks to
shut down debate about certain constitutional topics. However, as
noted above, absolutist rhetoric also engages the general public and
thereby spurs popular constitutionalism, which can, in turn, help
shape the Court’s future views.476 The Court’s rhetorical absolutism
thus may undermine the very judicial supremacy towards which it
gestures.
Rhetorical absolutism ostensibly resists the role of non-judicial
actors insofar as it insists on the correctness of the authoring
Justice’s views of constitutional law. It suggests, for example, that
the executive implementing the laws must defer to judicial constitutional constructions. Rather than viewing judicial opinions as mere
explanations that may predict future judicial behavior, absolutist
474. Cf. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 12 (1996)
(describing a method of deliberation that will encourage more participation in democracy).
475. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (indicating that constitutional
decisions by the Supreme Court may not be overruled by acts of Congress).
476. See ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 260, at 18-19 (discussing the high level of political
involvement by Americans even in a hyperpolarized political society).
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opinions insist more vigorously, albeit implicitly, that judicial
constitutional constructions are binding not just in the instant case
but in future cases as well.477 Under this view, the other branches
need not bother to offer their own interpretations.478
Although absolutism reflects the Court’s effort to retain its
hegemony over constitutional meaning, it can also help trigger a
popular reaction that may, in time, force the Court to reconsider.479
Indeed, the Court that announces its opinions as an authoritative
law-giver may be more likely to exacerbate social tensions, thereby
threatening its long-term institutional reputation.480 Even though
the public theoretically can read any opinion, absolutist opinions
carry on more direct conversations with the public and therefore are
more likely to garner attention. Dean Post has observed that the
membrane between constitutional law and culture is often “highly
porous,” so constitutional law is infused with constitutional beliefs
and values of non-judicial actors.481 In seeking to tighten its grip on
constitutional meaning, the Court’s constitutional absolutism may
sometimes make this membrane even more porous.
Interestingly, the Court sometimes uses rhetorical absolutism to
conceal this very phenomenon. For example, though Heller is
couched as an originalist opinion,482 it also can be understood as the
triumph of the popular gun rights movement.483 As Professor Reva
Siegel has argued, Heller tracked the NRA’s efforts to shape public
understanding about the Second Amendment, demonstrating “how
constitutional politics can guide and discipline judicial review.”484
Justice Scalia, of course, framed his discussion of the Second
Amendment’s original public meaning in absolutist terms, thereby
signaling that he was guided solely by the text’s meaning in 1791.485
477. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for
Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 75-76 (1993).
478. See id. at 75.
479. Cf. Berger, supra note 197, at 817 (explaining how the Lawrence v. Texas decision left
some questions open to public discourse).
480. See Merrill, supra note 477, at 76; cf. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT
193 (1992) (discussing the effect of Dred Scott v. Sandford on the American public).
481. Post, supra note 30, at 41.
482. See supra note 77.
483. See Siegel, supra note 214, at 192.
484. Id. at 243.
485. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008); supra notes 80-89 and
accompanying text.
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However, as Professor Siegel contends, contemporary politics likely
also shaped the Court’s understanding of the relevant history and
language.486
2. The Tension Between Absolutism and Minimalism
Absolutism may also sometimes conflict with the practice of
judicial minimalism. As Professor Sunstein has explained, the
Justices sometimes say no more than they must to resolve the
instant dispute, because it is often easier to agree on an outcome
than the underlying reasoning or future applications.487 Thus, they
often leave important issues undecided.488 Relatedly, Justices often
provide low- or mid-level justifications for their constitutional
decisions, eschewing grand theories.489 Minimalism, then, is a recurrent, though not constant, feature of the Court’s jurisprudence.490
Absolutist rhetoric belies these more cautious judicial practices.
On the one hand, many Justices recognize the value of moving
incrementally, deciding no more than necessary in each case.491 On
the other hand, the Justices sometimes go out of their way to reject
competing theories of law.492 To be sure, the scope of a holding and
the rhetorical tone announcing that decision are distinct concepts,
but one might think that an incremental, Burkean Court might also
resist aggressive pronouncements about constitutional meaning.493
And yet the same Court that proceeds cautiously in many a case
also often announces its holdings with great rhetorical force. Of
486. Siegel, supra note 214, at 201.
487. Sunstein, supra note 356, at 15.
488. Colin Starger, The Virtue of Obscurity, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 17, 18 (2013),
http://lawweb2009.law.villanova.edu/lawreview/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Starger_
Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/9AUZ-CEDJ] (“Sometimes respect for etiquette counsels that the
Court should dance around a little before declaring: ‘The Constitution does not allow this.’”);
Sunstein, supra note 356, at 6 (“Frequently judges decide no more than they have to decide.
They leave things open.”).
489. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 101 (1996).
490. See Sunstein, supra note 356, at 14-16.
491. Id. at 15 (“Minimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down broad rules; they
ask that decisions be narrow rather than wide. They decide the case at hand; they do not
decide other cases too unless they are forced to do so.”).
492. Id.
493. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006)
(defining Burkean minimalism as requiring constitutional principles to be established in an
incremental manner and with reference to long-standing practice).
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course, the explanation for these tensions likely lies in the particularities of the case and the Justices involved, but the very tensions
suggest that minimalism, although important, competes against
other values the Court likewise tries to uphold.494
3. The Tension Between Absolutism and Judicial Findings of
Indeterminacy
Ironically, though the Justices often pretend that constitutional
law is clearer than it is, they also sometimes highlight legal
indeterminacy. In certain areas of law, the availability of a judicial
remedy requires a finding that the law be “clearly established.” The
Court in such cases often refuses to grant relief on the grounds that
pre-existing law was not sufficiently clear. In the qualified immunity context, for example, the Court has held that “governmental
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.”495 Though the Court has
said that a case precisely on point is not necessary to create “clearly
established law,”496 it nevertheless sometimes emphasizes the
indeterminacy arising from the absence of cases on point to dismiss
cases on qualified immunity grounds.497 A similar phenomenon
exists in the context of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, which likewise instructs that a federal court
may overturn a state court’s habeas denial only if it was contrary to
“clearly established Federal law.”498
Thus, in both the qualified immunity and habeas contexts, the
Court frequently invokes the lack of legal clarity to deny judicial
relief.499 However otherwise justifiable, this practice once again
494. See Sunstein, supra note 356, at 15-17.
495. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
496. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
497. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (“At the time of al-Kidd’s
arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively
reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.”); Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that none of the relevant precedent
“squarely governs the case here”).
498. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013).
499. See, e.g., Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1157-58
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demonstrates that the Court’s absolutist rhetoric sits in tension
with other judicial practices. Indeed, the litigant denied § 1983 or
habeas relief on the grounds that the asserted legal violation was
not clearly enough established may be astonished to learn how clear
many Justices seem to find other cases.
4. The Paradoxical Overabundance and Dearth of Candor
Finally, rhetorical absolutism reveals a paradoxical overabundance and dearth of candor. Many critics believe “[a] judge’s written
opinions should fairly reflect her actual reasoning.”500 Transparency
allows external evaluation of judicial opinions, which in turn may
make judges more cautious, thereby helping to “rein[ ] in judicial
discretion.”501 By contrast, “a lack of candor transforms the rule of
law into the rule of men by allowing judges to reach their preferred
results without confronting” contrary legal evidence.502
In some respects, absolutism reflects judicial candor. Justice
Scalia’s absolutism in Heller likely reflects his own self-certainty as
much as it reflects a conscious rhetorical strategy.503 On this
account, Justice Scalia’s opinion is just proclaiming the view of law
that he genuinely believes.504
In another sense, however, this kind of opinion can reflect an
absence of candor. However certain Justice Scalia may have been in
Heller that he understood the evidence correctly, he was also well
(2005) (arguing that many qualified immunity cases search for “clearly established”
statements of blackletter law though substantive constitutional tort cases proceed along a
common law mode that “does not naturally generate the types of holdings likely to be
considered ‘clearly established’ ”); Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case
for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 596 (2009) (noting
“[m]ore than a dozen” cases in which “the Supreme Court has reversed an appellate court's
decision granting post-conviction habeas relief to a state prisoner: not because it concluded
that the state court had acted correctly, but because the state court's error was neither
contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.”).
500. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 97; see also David L. Shapiro, In Defense of
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 750 (1987) (“[T]he fidelity of judges to law can be
fairly measured only if they believe what they say in their opinions.”).
501. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 98.
502. Id.
503. See id. at 103 (noting that Justice Scalia’s opinions often seem to be “candid
expressions of his views”).
504. See Kelley, supra note 413, at 1604 (arguing that Scalia has, throughout his career as
a Justice, pursued “intellectual integrity, a consistent jurisprudence”).
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aware that the four-Justice dissent had at least some plausible
arguments. In this sense, his absolutist rhetoric reflects a willful
refusal to engage with the other side’s argument fairly and seriously.505 The same could be said of the absolutist opinions in
Rosenberger, Citizens United, Graham, and Shelby County, as well
as several of the dissents in those cases.506
Absolutist rhetoric, indeed, may help Justices mask the extent to
which subjective values color their interpretations of equivocal
evidence.507 Given that the Heller vote broke down along predictable
ideological lines, reasonable observers might think that the Justices’
own values shaped their interpretations of the relevant evidence.508
By pretending that the evidence commanded a particular constitutional result, absolutism helps Justices conceal these value
choices—to their audience and perhaps also to themselves.509
Although candid in one sense, absolutist rhetoric’s tunnel-visioned
view of the evidence is, in another sense, a sort of self-deception.
IV. THE MERITS OF APORETIC ENGAGEMENT
Though a plausible case can be made either way, absolutist
rhetoric’s costs likely outweigh its benefits, at least in most cases.
To be sure, more equivocal language would not have been appropriate in Brown and Loving, but especially in a post-civil-rights era,
few cases demand such unanimity and moral conviction. Indeed,
unlike those cases, many constitutional cases today are difficult
precisely because reasonable people can disagree on the constitutional and ethical principles.510 Of course, some reasonable people
questioned whether the desegregation cases in their day rested on
neutral constitutional principles.511 Nevertheless, the Justices
505. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence,
56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009) (“[T]he Court’s reasoning is at critical points so
defective—and in some respects so transparently nonoriginalist—that Heller should be seen
as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority opinion.”).
506. See supra Part I.B.
507. See Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at 2014.
508. See supra note 296-307 and accompanying text.
509. See Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at 2014.
510. See id. at 2010.
511. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1959).
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unanimously agreed in Brown and Loving, and those decisions are
universally regarded as correct years later.512 Few significant
constitutional cases today command that kind of judicial unanimity,
and it is hard to imagine the court of public opinion coming to any
consensus about the cases examined in Part I of this Article within
the next half century.513
Indeed, it is also important to remember that even though Brown
did not admit doubt, it also did not say very much. Chief Justice
Warren insisted that the opinion be “short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory.”514
Brown, then, contained only some of the hallmarks of absolutist
rhetoric. On the one hand, it admitted no doubt, deliberately steering away from serious engagement with counterarguments, contrary
precedent, and potential objections to its own controversial social
science claims.515 In that sense, it was absolutist. On the other hand,
the Court avoided strident language and, even after two opinions,
was notoriously unclear about what it required.516 From that
perspective, Brown was a cautious political document designed “not
to antagonize needlessly the editorial writers of the great Southern
newspapers, who would have to translate the decision for their
readers, and the politicians, who would presumably have to take the
lead in advising compliance with the decision.”517 Brown’s tone,
while unequivocal, still ought not be mistaken for full-blown absolutism.
In all events, Brown and Loving are hardly ordinary, and in less
momentous cases, many of absolutist rhetoric’s benefits usually can
be achieved with more modest language. For one, even if the Court
were to use more equivocal language, it could still issue clear,
binding holdings. Even more importantly, it is doubtful that
512. See Doty, supra note 453, at 111.
513. I suspect gay rights cases like United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) and
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), eventually will be widely recognized as correct in
their outcomes, if not in all of their reasoning. That said, at the moment of decision, both
garnered at least three dissents—four in the case of Windsor—and thus divided the Court far
more than Brown or Loving did.
514. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 58 (1992) (quoting Chief Justice
Warren).
515. See Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at 2033-34.
516. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring public schools to
desegregate “with all deliberate speed”).
517. Levinson, supra note 5, at 198.
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absolutist rhetoric actually furthers the rule of law. Given the
under-determinacy of constitutional text and the unpredictability of
constitutional doctrine, the formalist’s conceit that there exists a
“correct” answer seems overstated in most constitutional cases that
reach the Supreme Court. Whatever formalism’s theoretical
benefits, as a descriptive matter, constitutional law’s evolution
cannot be explained in formalist terms.518
And yet, despite constitutional doctrine’s erratic twists and
turns,519 Americans take the Court’s decisions seriously. They may
condemn particular rulings, but twenty-first-century Americans
rarely flout them.520 Given doctrinal unpredictability, it is unlikely
that parties, lower courts, and government officials abide by the
Court’s constitutional pronouncements because they believe the
Court has somehow divined the objective constitutional truth. On
the contrary, people follow these rulings because they accept the
Court’s role within our separation-of-powers system to say what the
law is,521 so long as its answers fall within a range of plausible
outcomes.522 Accordingly, absolutist rhetoric’s presumption of objectivity is more likely to undermine, rather than foster, faith in an
impartial judiciary.523
It may be hard to imagine the Justices rejecting the practice of
rhetorical absolutism altogether, especially in light of the fact that
it is difficult to mitigate, and virtually impossible to eliminate, the
various institutional and psychological pressures contributing to the
phenomenon.524 That said, Justices could pay more attention to
these issues, and the Presidents who appoint them could seek
518. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 28-31 (2000) (rejecting
formalism).
519. See ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS, at xvi (2012).
520. See, e.g., Richard E. Welch III, “They Will Not Open Their Ears”: Should We Listen to
the Supreme Court and Should the Court Listen to Us, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 94 (2012)
(“American society now unquestionably obeys most any Supreme Court ruling.”).
521. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 17 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
522. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 49; STRAUSS, supra note 9, at 39.
523. See SEGALL, supra note 519, at xvi.
524. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System 2-3 (Univ. Of Chi.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 422, 2013), available at
http://perma.cc/YE3B-5EW8 (arguing that many public law theorists’ optimistic, publicspirited solutions are unrealistic antidotes to their “pessimistic accounts of the ambitious,
partisan or self-interested motives of relevant actors in the legal system”).
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judges whose professional records resist absolutism and admit more
intellectual humility.525 Indeed, while the phenomenon of absolutist
rhetoric is pervasive, it should not be difficult for Justices to adjust
their language modestly to acknowledge competing constitutional
values and model a more conciliatory constitutional discourse.
Justices also might think more carefully about when strong rhetoric
is most appropriate. Absolutist language has a place for condemning
dangerous or demonstrably incorrect ideas. However, like the boy
who cried wolf, some Justices today use it so freely that it no longer
carries much rhetorical force.
One alternative to absolutist rhetoric, as Professor Kahan argues,
would be “the cultivation of judicial idioms of aporia.”526 “Aporia”
refers to a mode of argumentative engagement that acknowledges
complexity and competing evidence.527 Aporetic engagement need
not preclude a definitive resolution of a case, but rather treats as
false a resolution that purports to be unproblematic.528 Under this
approach, Justices could admit the difficulty of a case or the legitimacy of the losing side’s constitutional values without compromising
the clarity of their holding. Indeed, constitutional litigation often
presents “tragic choices,” in that there are no unequivocally good or
evil outcomes but instead competing stakeholders with colorable
constitutional arguments.529 By openly acknowledging the tragic
nature of a case, the Court can show greater respect to the constitutional loser, thereby somewhat mitigating the cultural alienation of
defeat.
Several modest steps could help the Justices improve their
engagement with the losing side. First, the Justices could strive for
greater humility in their opinions, conceding that the evidence is
often equivocal.530 Second, and relatedly, the Justices could more
overtly recognize that their tragic choices will harm some group
while articulating the portions of that group’s constitutional vision
525. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 118.
526. Kahan, supra note 4, at 62.
527. See id. at 62-63.
528. See id. at 63.
529. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17-23 (1978) (discussing
“tragic choices” between deeply held conflicting values); see also CALHOUN, supra note 355,
at 59; DEGIROLAMI, supra note 234, at 59-78 (discussing the clash of values of religious
liberty).
530. See CALHOUN, supra note 355, at 71.
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that remain legitimate or open for debate.531 Third, the Court could
abandon the convention of relying on the dissent to explain the
losing side’s interests and arguments.532 Fourth, the Court could
more candidly acknowledge the levels on which its determinations
are debatable and the levels on which they are not.533 Fifth, the
Justices could do a better job treating each other as reasonable,
intelligent people acting in good faith. Even when a Justice is
certain he is correct, the fact that some of his colleagues see things
differently should encourage him to consider whether the case may
in fact be closer than he presumes.
In addition to moderating the tone of judicial opinions, aporetic
engagement may also challenge Justices to reconsider the assumptions driving their own decision making. As noted above, when
Justices vehemently disagree with each other in cases that seem
close, it is often because they understand the law and facts entirely
differently. These assumptions are often driven by a Justice’s own
personal experiences, ideological allegiances, and group identities.534
Although it would be unrealistic to expect Justices to abandon their
worldviews, they could more consciously engage with the different
factors shaping their outlooks. As Professor Paul Secunda argues,
“the practices of humility and writing opinions in an aporetic manner encourage judges to self-reflect on how culturally motivated
cognition may color their view of legally consequential facts and,
thereafter, avoid basing decisions on those biases.”535 Aporetic
engagement, then, can help further important judicial qualities of
“open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and group deliberation.”536
Such a rhetorical shift would help mitigate some of absolutism’s
costs. It would likely produce opinions offering a more thorough
account of constitutional decision making, candidly assessing the
kinds of evidence that go into a constitutional judgment. Rather
than dismissively rejecting certain lines of argument, such an approach would explain why certain arguments were more persuasive
531. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 529, at 17-23; DEGIROLAMI, supra note 234, at
59-78.
532. See CALHOUN, supra note 355, at 70.
533. See Ferguson, supra note 226, at 219.
534. See supra Part II.C.1.
535. Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 373, 389-90 (2012).
536. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 16, at 96 (discussing important judicial qualities).
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in a particular context.537 In this sense, Justices could more completely convey the extent to which constitutional decision making
involves “wickedly complex problem[s], fraught with empirical uncertainty.”538
A rhetorical shift along these lines might actually help improve
the public’s opinion of the judiciary. Recent psychological research
indicates that people tend to object less to judicial decisions that
acknowledge that each side has some persuasive arguments.539 It
similarly suggests that “aporetic reasoning substantially reduce[s]
disagreement with the court’s decision.”540 Research in this area is
ongoing, but the studies so far suggest that, far from undermining
the Court’s legitimacy, a more candid acknowledgment of cases’
inherent difficulties could, in fact, enhance it.541
Finally, this shift could, as Jürgen Habermas theorizes, help law
“satisfy the precarious conditions of a social integration that
ultimately takes place through the achievements of mutual understanding.”542 We typically think of the legislative process as helping
“citizens reach an understanding about the rules for their living
together.”543 But courts can play a role in that didactic process, too,
particularly if they conceive of themselves not only as the arbiters
of disputes but more generally as custodians of a rich, diverse
constitutional heritage.544 Of course, this process will not work
perfectly in every case, but a rhetorical shift could help the Court
use language better to encourage a societal “mutual understanding”
without coercion.545 As Judge Learned Hand once put it, “The spirit
537. See Hill, supra note 402, at 1819.
538. Strauss, supra note 370, at 386.
539. See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision-Making, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 709 (2011) (summarizing psychological research indicating that
people tend to find judicial opinions more acceptable when they were accompanied by a “more
equivocal and nuanced form of reasoning”).
540. Robert R. Robinson, It’s How You Say It: Ameliorating Motivated Reactions to Judicial
Rulings Using Aporetic Reasoning 24-25 (Jul. 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://perma.cc/4EWM-TSK9.
541. See id. at 25.
542. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 83 (William Rehg trans., 2d ed. 1996).
543. Id. at 84.
544. See CALHOUN, supra note 355, at 99-101 (discussing Habermas’s theory and judicial
review).
545. See HABERMAS, supra note 542, at 103.
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of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right”; rather
than seeking to coerce fellow citizens, it “seeks to understand the
minds of other men and women.”546
CONCLUSION
Early in his Supreme Court tenure, Justice Blackmun circulated
an equivocal opinion to his colleagues and received a rebuke from a
senior colleague. Justice Blackmun’s opinions sometimes had an
unusual “on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand” kind of quality,547 and
Justice Black, for one, did not approve. “Always go for the jugular,”
Black instructed Blackmun.548 “Never agonize in an opinion. Make
it sound as though it’s just as clear as crystal.”549 Justice Blackmun
had honestly tried to weigh the competing arguments in the case,
but Justice Black wanted the opposite.
One can understand why Justice Black advised his junior colleague not to voice his doubts. As the highest court in the land, the
Supreme Court must inspire compliance by both private and public
actors.550 And there are instances, such as the desegregation cases,
when confident opinions are appropriate.551 But this rhetorical
certainty is the norm in many constitutional cases, including some
when the only obvious thing is that there is no obvious answer.552
None of this is to say that Justices should not articulate their
constitutional views honestly and forcefully. It is natural that the
Justices would do so with vigor, and it is often advantageous to do
so in a democratic society.553 But the rhetoric of constitutional
absolutism has costs, and it is not clear that our adversarial legal
system or spirited public discourse would suffer if the Justices
sometimes acknowledged that opposing arguments are rooted in
546. See HAND, supra note 2, at 190.
547. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 213-16 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging the strength of some of the dissent’s arguments but explaining
why he voted with the majority anyway); Sanford Levinson, United States: Assessing Heller,
7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 316, 327 (2009) (noting that Justice Blackmun, unlike most Justices,
sometimes confessed in print how close he was to deciding a case the other way).
548. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 60 (2005).
549. Id.
550. See supra note 520 and accompanying text.
551. See supra notes 452-58 and accompanying text.
552. See Chemerinsky, supra note 194, at 2012.
553. See supra Part III.B.

2015]

THE RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL ABSOLUTISM

757

real constitutional norms backed up by text, history, precedent, and
the like.
Indeed, it is quite remarkable that most actors in our political
system ignore the possibility of a more compromising constitutional
discourse that does greater justice to the Constitution’s complexity
and contradictions. Legal realists and others have contended for
generations that law is not discovered through the mechanical
application of rules but rather reflects the judges’ own belief system.
Psychological and attitudinal political science research suggests
that this insight may be correct, and polls measuring popular
attitudes towards the judiciary further indicate that the general
public has largely accepted this neo-realist view.554 Nevertheless,
both the Court and the public perpetuate the conceit that most cases
have clear, objective constitutional answers just waiting to be found.
Of course, it would be difficult to change the culture of constitutional rhetoric, and any such change would not drastically alter the
nation’s destiny. But we invoke the Constitution so often that we
seem no longer to hear how we actually discuss it. It is time we start
listening.

554. See supra note 402-03 and accompanying text.

